This plan however demanded promptness and energy, and Murray professed neither. The weather was so favourable, that a voyage which might have consumed nine or ten days was performed in two, the Spanish troops punctually effected their junction, the initial operations were secured, Fort Balaguer fell, the French moved from all sides to the succour of Taragona, the line of the Xucar was weakened, the diversion was complete. In the night of the 12th the bulk of Murray’s army was again afloat, a few hours would have sufficed to embark the cavalry at the Col de Balaguer, and the whole might have sailed for the city of Valencia, while Suchet’s advanced guard was still on the hills above Monroig, and he, still uncertain as to the fate of Taragona, one hundred and fifty miles from the Xucar. In fine Murray had failed to attain the first object pointed out by Wellington’s instructions, but the second was within his reach; instead of grasping it he loitered about the Col de Balaguer, and gave Suchet, as we shall find, time to reach Valencia again. [Sidenote: Defence of sir J. Murray in Phillipart’s Military Calendar.] [Sidenote: See Plan, No. 1.] Now whether the letter or the spirit of Wellington’s instructions be considered, there was here a manifest dereliction on the part of Murray. What was that officer’s defence? That no specific period being named for his return to Valencia, he was entitled to exercise his discretion! Did he then as an independent general perform any useful or brilliant action to justify his delay? No! his tale was one of loss and dishonour! The improvident arrangements for the siege of San Felippe de Balaguer, and the unexpected fortune which saved him from the shame of abandoning his guns there also have been noted; and it has been shown, that when the gain of time was the great element of success, he neither urged Copons to break up the roads, nor pushed the siege of Taragona with vigour. The feeble formality of this latter operation has indeed been imputed to the engineer major Thackary, yet unjustly so. It was the part of that officer to form a plan of attack agreeable to the rules of art, it might be a bold or a cautious plan, and many persons did think Taragona was treated by him with too much respect; but it was the part of the commander-in-chief, to decide, if the general scheme of operations required a deviation from the regular course. The untrammelled engineer could then have displayed his genius. Sir John Murray made no sign. His instructions and his ultimate views were withheld alike, from his naval colleague, from his second in command, and from his quarter-master-general; and while the last-named functionary was quite shut out from the confidence of his commander, the admiral, and many others, both of the army and navy, imagined him to be the secret author of the proceedings which were hourly exciting their indignation. Murray however declared on his trial, that he had rejected general Donkin’s