On the other hand it is also clear that the corps of Byng, Morillo, Campbell, Cole, Picton, and Hill were only pieces of resistance on Lord Wellington’s board, and that the sixth, seventh, and light divisions were those with which he meant to win his game. There was however a great difference in their value. The light division and the seventh, especially the former, being at the greatest distance from Pampeluna, having enemies close in front and certain points to guard, were, the seventh division a day, the light division two days, behind the sixth division, which was quite free to move at an instant’s notice and was, the drag of D’Erlon’s corps considered, a day nearer to Pampeluna than Hill. Wherefore upon the rapid handling of this well-placed body the fate of the allies depended. If it arrived in time, nearly thirty thousand infantry with sufficient cavalry and artillery would be established, under the immediate command of the general-in-chief, on a position of strength to check the enemy until the rest of the army arrived. Where that position was and how the troops were there gathered and fought shall now be shown. CHAPTER V. BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES. [Sidenote: 1813. July.] [Sidenote: Plan 3.] _Combat of Roncesvalles._—On the 23d Soult issued an order of the day remarkable for its force and frankness. Tracing with a rapid pen the leading events of the past campaign, he shewed that the disasters sprung from the incapacity of the king, not from the weakness of the soldiers whose military virtue he justly extolled, and whose haughty courage he inflamed by allusions to former glories. He has been, by writers who disgrace English literature with unfounded aspersions of a courageous enemy, accused of unseemly boasting as to his ultimate operations at this time, but the calumny is refuted by the following passage from his dispatch to the minister at war. “_I shall move directly upon Pampeluna, and if I succeed in relieving it I will operate towards my right to embarrass the enemy’s troops in Guipuscoa, Biscay, and Alava, and to enable the reserve to join me, which will relieve St. Sebastian and Santona. If this should happen I will then consider what is to be done, either to push my own attack or to help the army of Aragon, but to look so far ahead would now be temerity._” It is true that conscious of superior abilities he did not suppress the sentiment of his own worth as a commander, but he was too proud to depreciate brave adversaries on the eve of battle. “_Let us not_,” he said, “_defraud the enemy of the praise which is due to him. The dispositions of the general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive, the valour and steadiness of his troops have been praiseworthy_.” Having thus stimulated the ardour of his troops he put himself at the head of Clauzel’s divisions, and on the 25th at daylight led them up against the rocks of Altobiscar.