History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 6Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 6
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
1º. San Sebastian a third-rate fortress and in bad condition when
first invested, resisted a besieging army, possessing an enormous
battering train, for sixty-three days. This is to be attributed
partly to the errors of the besiegers, principally to obstructions
extraneous to the military operations. Amongst the last are to be
reckoned the misconduct of the Admiralty, and the negligence of the
government relative to the battering train and supply of ammunition;
the latter retarded the second siege for sixteen days; the former
enabled the garrison to keep up and even increase its means as the
siege proceeded.
Next, in order and importance, was the failure of the Spanish
authorities, who neglected to supply carts and boats from the
country, and even refused the use of their public buildings for
hospitals. Thus between the sea and the shore, receiving aid from
neither, lord Wellington had to conduct an operation of war which
more than any other depends for success upon labour and provident
care. It was probably the first time that an important siege was
maintained by women’s exertions; the stores of the besiegers were
landed from boats rowed by Spanish girls!
Another impediment was Soult’s advance towards Pampeluna, but the
positive effect of this was slight since the want of ammunition would
have equally delayed the attack. The true measure of the English
government’s negligence is thus obtained. It was more mischievous
than the operations of sixty thousand men under a great general.
2º. The errors of execution having been before touched upon need no
further illustration. The greatest difference between the first and
second part of the siege preceding the assaults, was that in the
latter, the approaches near the isthmus being carried further on and
openings made in the sea-wall, the troops more easily and rapidly
extricated themselves from the trenches, the distance to the breach
was shortened, and the French fire bearing on the fronts of attack
was somewhat less powerful. These advantages were considerable, but
not proportionate to the enormous increase of the besiegers’ means;
and it is quite clear from the terrible effects of the cannonade
during the assault, that the whole of the defences might have been
ruined, even those of the castle, if this overwhelming fire had in
compliance with the rules of art been first employed to silence the
enemy’s fire. A lodgement in the horn-work could then have been made
with little difficulty, and the breach attacked without much danger.
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