History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 6Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 6
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Soult, now on the defensive, was yet so fearful of an attack
along the Nive, that his uneasy movements made the allies think
he was again preparing for offensive operations. This double
misunderstanding did not however last long, and each army resumed its
former position.
The fall of San Sebastian had given lord Wellington a new port and
point of support, had increased the value of Passages as a depôt,
and let loose a considerable body of troops for field operations;
the armistice in Germany was at an end, Austria had joined the
allies, and it seemed therefore certain that he would immediately
invade France. The English cabinet had promised the continental
sovereigns that it should be so when the French were expelled from
Spain, meaning Navarre and Guipuscoa; and the newspaper editors
were, as usual, actively deceiving the people of all countries by
their dictatorial absurd projects and assumptions. Meanwhile the
partizans of the Bourbons were secretly endeavouring to form a
conspiracy in the south, and the duke of Berri desired to join the
British army, pretending that twenty thousand Frenchmen were already
armed and organized at the head of which he would place himself.
In fine all was exultation and extravagance. But lord Wellington,
well understanding the inflated nature of such hopes and promises,
while affecting to rebuke the absurdity of the newspapers, took the
opportunity to check similar folly in higher places, by observing,
“_that if he had done all that was expected he should have been
before that period in the moon_.”
With respect to the duke of Berri’s views, it was for the sovereigns
he said to decide whether the restoration of the Bourbons should form
part of their policy, but as yet no fixed line of conduct on that or
any other political points was declared. It was for their interest to
get rid of Napoleon, and there could be no question of the advantage
or propriety of accepting the aid of a Bourbon party without pledging
themselves to dethrone the emperor. The Bourbons might indeed
decline, in default of such a pledge, to involve their partizans in
rebellion, and he advised them to do so, because Napoleon’s power
rested internally upon the most extensive and expensive system of
corruption ever established in any country, externally upon his
military force which was supported almost exclusively by foreign
contributions; once confined to the limits of France he would be
unable to bear the double expense of his government and army, the
reduction of either would be fatal to him, and the object of the
Bourbons would thus be obtained without risk. But, if they did not
concur in this reasoning, the allies in the north of Europe must
declare they would dethrone Napoleon before the duke of Berri should
be allowed to join the army; and the British government must make up
its mind upon the question.
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