History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 6Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 6
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
enemy has proved that armies can be maintained in Spain, at the
expense of the Spanish nation, infinitely larger than are necessary
for its defence.”
These evils he attributed to the incapacity of the public servants,
and to their overwhelming numbers, that certain sign of an
unprosperous state; to the disgraceful negligence and disregard
of public duties, and to there being no power in the country for
enforcing the law; the collection of the revenue cost in several
branches seventy and eighty per cent. Meanwhile no Spanish officers
capable of commanding a large body of troops or keeping it in an
efficient state had yet appeared, no efficient staff, no system of
military administration had been formed, and no shame for these
deficiencies, no exertions to amend were visible.
From this picture two conclusions are to be drawn, 1º. that the
provinces, thus described as superabounding in resources, having been
for several years occupied by the French armies, the warfare of the
latter could not have been so devastating and barbarous as it was
represented. 2º. That Spain, being now towards the end as helpless
as she had been at the beginning and all through the war, was quite
unequal to her own deliverance either by arms or policy; that it was
English valour English steel, directed by the genius of an English
general, which rising superior to all obstacles, whether presented
by his own or the peninsular governments or by the perversity
of national character, worked out her independence. So utterly
inefficient were the Spaniards themselves, that now, at the end of
six years’ war, lord Wellington declared thirty thousand of their
troops could not be trusted to act separately; they were only useful
when mixed in the line with larger numbers of other nations. And yet
all men in authority to the lowest alcalde were as presumptuous as
arrogant and as perverse as ever. Seeming to be rendered callous to
public misery by the desperate state of affairs, they were reckless
of the consequences of their actions and never suffered prudential
considerations or national honour to check the execution of any
project. The generals from repeated failures had become insensible to
misfortunes, and without any remarkable display of personal daring,
were always ready to deliver battle on slight occasions, as if that
were a common matter instead of being the great event of war.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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