‘These dispositions produced a remarkable change, tranquillity was re-established, and the confidence was such, that in the province (Entre Minho e Douro) all the inhabitants returned to their labours, supplied the markets and familiarized themselves with the idea of an approaching change.’... ‘Marshal Soult received numerous deputations of the clergy to thank him for the attentions he paid them, and for the order which he had restored. Before this no Frenchman could straggle without being mutilated and killed. The Portuguese, believing that it was glorious and grateful to God to do all the mischief possible to the army, had perpetrated the most dreadful horrors on the wretched soldiers who fell into their hands.’ It would be too tedious and unprofitable to the reader to continue thus following the reviewer step by step. Wherefore, neglecting his farrago about the principles of war, and his application of them to show how I am wrong in my statement, that, in a _strategic point of view it was better to attack Victor, but that especial circumstances_ led sir Arthur to fall upon Soult, I hold it sufficient to place sir Arthur’s own statement before the reader and leave him to compare it with mine. ‘_Lisbon, April 24, 1809._ ‘I intend to move towards Soult and attack him, if I should be able to make any arrangement in the neighbourhood of Abrantes which can give me any security for the safety of this place during my absence to the northward. ‘I am not quite certain, however, that I should not do more good to the general cause by combining with general Cuesta in an operation against Victor; and I believe I should prefer the last if Soult was not in possession of a part of this country very fertile in resources, and of the town of Oporto, and if to concert the operations with Cuesta would not take time which might be profitably employed in operations against Soult. I think it probable, however, that Soult will not remain in Portugal when I shall pass the Mondego. If he does I shall attack him. _If he should retire, I am convinced that it would be most advantageous for the common cause that we should remain upon the defensive in the north of Portugal, and act vigorously in co-operation with Cuesta against Victor._ ‘An operation against Victor is attended by these advantages—if successful it effectually relieves Seville and Lisbon, and in case affairs should take such a turn as to enable the King’s ministers to make another great effort for the relief of Spain, the corps under my command in Portugal will not be removed to such a distance from the scene of operation as to render its co-operation impossible; and we may hope to see the effect of a great effort made by a combined and concentrated force.’