History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 6Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 6
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
All the reviewer’s remarks about Cuesta’s numbers, and about
the unfordable nature of the Tagus, are a reproduction of
misrepresentations and objections before exposed and refuted by me
in my controversy with marshal Beresford; but as it is now attempted
to support them by garbled extracts from better authorities, I will
again and completely expose and crush them. This will however be more
conveniently done farther on. Meanwhile I repeat, that the Tagus is
only unfordable during the winter, and not then if there is a few
days dry weather; that six months of the year it is always fordable
in many places, and as low down as Salvaterra near Lisbon; finally,
that my expression, ‘_a river fordable at almost every season_,’
is strictly correct, and is indeed not mine but lord Wellington’s
expression. To proceed with the rest:—
Without offering any proof beyond his own assertion, the reviewer
charges me with having _exaggerated the importance of D’Argenton’s
conspiracy for the sole purpose of excusing Soult’s remissness in
guarding the Douro_. But my account of that conspiracy was compiled
from the duke of Wellington’s letters—some public, some private
addressed to me; and from a narrative of the conspiracy written
expressly for my guidance by major-general sir James Douglas, who
was the officer employed to meet and conduct D’Argenton to and from
the English army;—from Soult’s own official report; from Le Noble’s
history; and from secret information which I received from a French
officer who was himself one of the principal movers—not of that
particular conspiracy—but of a general one of which the one at Oporto
was but a branch.
Again, the reviewer denies that I am correct in saying, that Soult
thought Hill’s division had been disembarked from the ocean; that he
expected the vessels would come to the mouth of the Douro; and that
considering that river secure above the town his personal attention
was directed to the line below Oporto. Let Soult and Le Noble answer
this.
_Extract from Soult’s General Report._
‘In the night of the 9th and 10th the enemy made a _considerable
disembarkation at Aveiro, and another at Ovar_. The 10th, at
daybreak, they attacked the right flank of general Franceschi,
while the _column coming from Lisbon by Coimbra_ attacked him in
front.’
_Extract from Le Noble._
‘The house occupied by the general-in-chief was situated beyond
the town on the road to the sea. The site was very high, and from
thence he could observe the left bank of the Douro from the convent
to the sea. His orders, given on the 8th, to scour the left bank
of the river, those which he had expedited in the morning, and the
position of his troops, rendered him confident that no passage
would take place above Oporto; _he believed that the enemy, master
of the sea, would try a disembarkation near the mouth of the
Douro_.’
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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