The awful pause of suspense, which lasted many weeks, passed by. The Tugela river and the indecision of the Zulu king saved the colony. Reinforcements which had been telegraphed for poured in with amazing celerity, and both Natal and British honour were saved. For nine weeks the beleaguered column under General Pearson had to suffer privations, and the Zulus, who had experienced what British soldiers could do behind biscuit-boxes at Rorke's Drift, hesitated to attack them when behind regular entrenchments at Ekowe. At last, as we had seen, relief was sent. Then another period of delay set in. Masses of troops continued to arrive, and early in May our strength in Natal comprised more than 22,000 men, divided as follows:— First division (General Crealock's) 9,215 Second division (General Newdigate's) 10,238 General Wood's[32] flying column 3,092 —————— Effective and non-effective 22,545 [Sidenote: _The transport difficulty._] This was a large army, the most powerful force of Europeans ever engaged in war within South Africa. The occasion was supreme, as the greatest power of the native races had challenged the white man to a combat _à l'outrance_, and the question simply was whether the Queen or Cetywayo should rule supreme in the southern portion of this continent. Reinforcements were sent out with immense celerity, and landed with the utmost despatch and with neither casualty nor danger. But the delay in moving them was most disappointing. It must have puzzled the Zulus immensely to understand why we were so extraordinarily slow. Five weeks had elapsed since the battle of Ginghelovo without any set engagement with the enemy taking place, and the Press began to grumble. Transport rose to unprecedented rates. Twenty shillings per cwt., or £20 per ton, was charged for the carriage of provisions a distance of fifty-four miles, from D'Urban to Pietermaritzburg. Oxen died in hundreds, and the progress of the battalions of infantry which were marching against an enemy famous for their celerity was most disheartening. The plan of Lord Chelmsford was that of sending on masses of troops, whose _impedimenta_ in the shape of baggage and means of supply was so enormous as to completely cripple their movements. At a subsequent period, after the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley, we shall find that officer successfully employing more than 2000 Zulu carriers; but this method, cheap and efficient, does not seem to have been tried by Lord Chelmsford.