The special correspondent of _The Cape Argus_, however, writes about this time as follows: “Dunn states that Cetshwayo does not, even now, know fully the contents of the ultimatum, and still less of the subsequent memorandum.[113] The document was read over once, and its length was such (2222, pp. 203-9)—six pages of the Blue-book—that the messengers could not possibly fix the whole of it in their memory.” True, a copy was given to Dunn himself; but, for sufficient reasons of his own, he did not make known the contents of the document in person, but sent word to the king by his own messengers, between whom and the indunas there was a considerable discrepancy. According to Dunn, Cetshwayo was in a great fury upon hearing the word of the High Commissioner (? as to the maintenance of Boer “private rights” over his land). He reproached his adviser with having thwarted his purpose to exact satisfaction at the hands of the Dutch, and doubly blamed him for having represented the English as just in their intercourse and friendly in their intentions. Until this time he had thought, as Dunn himself had, that the congregation of troops upon his borders represented nothing but an idle scare. But he saw at length that the English had thrown the bullock’s skin over his head, while they had been devouring the tid-bits of the carcass. The three causes alleged in the ultimatum for war—the raid of Sihayo’s sons, the assault on Messrs. Smith and Deighton, and the proceedings of Umbilini—occurred long after Sir B. Frere had been preparing for war, in the full expectation that the Border Commission would decide against the Zulu claims, and that Cetshwayo would not acquiesce peacefully in such a decision. It would seem, indeed, from his remarks on the subject (Correspondence, Letters II. and IV.), that he would have even set aside the decision of the Commissioners, if he had found it possible to do so. Although he failed in doing this, he sought to attain practically the same end by means of a remarkable “memorandum,” prepared and signed by himself—not submitted to Sir Henry Bulwer, but “_prematurely_” published in the Natal newspapers. The memorandum in question was on the appointment of a Resident in Zululand, and, as Sir Bartle Frere himself says, “it was intended to explain for Cetshwayo’s benefit what was the nature of the cession to him of the ceded territory,” and it contained the following clause: “It is intended that in that district (the late disputed territory) individual rights of property, which were obtained under the Transvaal Government, shall be respected and maintained, so that any Transvaal farmers, who obtained rights from the Government of the Republic, and who may now elect to remain on the territory, may possess under British guarantee the same rights they would have possessed had they been grantees holding from the Zulu king under the guarantee of the great Zulu council.”