Sir M. Hicks-Beach, on October 17th, replies to Sir B. Frere’s despatches of 14th and 23rd September, that “arrangements will be made for the early despatch of some additional officers for special duty. Her Majesty’s Government are, however, not prepared to comply with the request for a reinforcement of troops. All the information that has hitherto reached them with respect to the position of affairs in Zululand appears to them to justify a confident hope that, by the exercise of prudence, and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance and reasonable compromise, it will be possible to avert the very serious evil of a war with Cetywayo; and they cannot but think that the forces now at your disposal in South Africa, together with the additional officers about to be sent, should suffice to meet any other emergency that may arise, without a further increase to the Imperial troops” (_ibid._ p. 273). On September 30th, Sir B. Frere writes from Pietermaritzburg: “I regret that I find the position of affairs in this colony far more critical even than I expected;” and, after a very exaggerated description of the state of affairs, he says: “An attempt of native tribes to combine to resist the white man and drive him back has been long foreseen. There can be no doubt that this design is now in process of attempted execution” (_ibid._ pp. 278-82). Of the truth of this startling assertion, let Sir H. Bulwer’s despatches, as well as after-events, speak. Enclosed in this despatch of Sir B. Frere is General Thesiger’s memorandum on the military requirements, and his sketch for a defensive scheme for Natal, for which he requires “6000 natives, 600 mounted men, 6 guns, and 3 battalions of British infantry;” but he remarks: “I cannot, however, conceal from myself that security from invasion depends almost entirely upon the forbearance of Cetywayo;” and says, “for defensive purposes alone, therefore, Natal and Transvaal colonies require 3 battalions of infantry in addition to what they have already got” (_ibid._ pp. 285, 286).