became greatly incensed and declared himself betrayed. I believe he would at once have invaded the Transvaal, but from fear of us in Natal. He hesitated, however, and according to the old maxim, he who hesitates does not fight; but before he had quieted down Sir B. Frere interfered with his _ultimatum_, and Cetywayo stood grandly on the defensive. He is a savage, and his ambition was to be a great savage; I do not mean a cruel one, but a powerful, influential savage. He was ambitious, but disliked progress, and such men must fail; so he has fallen, but with dignity. He has never attacked a neighbour, white or black; he has defended his country bravely, and has been guilty of no excesses. It has been our war, not his. Sir B. Frere says most truly that almost everyone he spoke to encouraged him to go to war; but I am afraid he avoided those who, he was told, were against war—and when will not Englishmen advise war? No argument was used, except the one that Cetywayo might overrun Natal at any moment; but he had never shown a disposition to do so, and we were stronger than men would allow. Men who do not trust in the arm of God do not see the defences which surround them. The Tugela, the river which separates Natal from Zululand, was a great protection, as in summer-time, even if fordable, the Zulus would not cross it, lest it should rise in their rear; and in the winter, our dry season, they cannot keep the field, as their naked bodies are quite unable to bear exposure to the cold nights. Moreover, though our own army will never acknowledge it, Cetywayo’s force did not exceed 30,000 naked savages. Of course we are told they were 60,000 or 80,000 strong; but if you casually inquire of any officer who has been in Zululand whether the kraals were thickly dotted over the country, he will tell you artlessly, “No, quite the contrary.” I have again and again inquired of traders as to the density of the population relative to Natal. I have inquired of those who have lived at Ulundi, and have seen Cetywayo’s regiments mustered, and I am confident that 30,000 is the very outside at which the Zulu force could be put. I may return to this. I mention it now to show why I do not agree with Sir Bartle in his view of our position; and certainly I cannot admit, because a neighbour is powerful, that therefore we are justified in going to war with him.