Out of this state of things eventually proceeded the war between the Boers and Sikukuni, the result of which was a very ambiguous one indeed; for although Sikukuni was driven out of the low-lying districts of the country, he took refuge in his stronghold, which affords such an impregnable position in a thickly-populated range of mountains as hitherto to have defied all attempts, whether made by Boers or by English, to reduce it.[55] Another important reason alleged at the time for taking possession of the Transvaal was that the border troubles between it and Zululand were becoming more serious every day; that, sooner or later, unless we interposed our authority, a war would break out between the Boers and the Zulus, into which we should inevitably be drawn. The Zulus, having continually entreated our protection, while at our desire they refrained from defending themselves by force of arms, were naturally rejoiced at an action on our part which looked like an answer to their oft-repeated prayer, and eagerly expected the reward of their long and patient waiting. But, however strongly we may feel that it was the duty of the more powerful nation to put a stop to the doings of the Transvaal Boers, even at considerable expense to ourselves, the manner in which we have acted, and the consequences which followed, have been such as to cause many sensible people to feel that we should have done better to withdraw our prohibition from Cetshwayo, and allow him and the Boers “to fight it out between them.”[56] We might have honestly and openly interfered and insisted upon putting a stop to the atrocities of the Boers, annexing their country if necessary to that end, but then we ourselves should have done justice to the natives on whose behalf we professed to interfere, instead of taking over with the country and carrying on those very quarrels and aggressions which we alleged as a sufficient reason for the annexation.