In fact, the present system of national banks could be made, with few changes in the regulations governing them, a most valuable adjunct to the plan as a distributing agency, and the plan is one that it would seem ought to meet with approval. They would, it is true, lose their present note circulation, but that, under existing laws and conditions, is of little or no profit to them. They would gain by its being unnecessary for them to keep so large a reserve of cash on hand as they are often obliged to do now; for not only would the whole financial system be more stable than now, but they might safely be allowed to carry a part of the present 15 to 25 per cent. reserve, required by law, in such securities as they could at all times use as collateral with the government. They would gain even more by the security such a system presents against panics and senseless runs, which so often compel solvent banks to close their doors. In short, the government would act toward the banks, not as a competitor, but rather in the relation that the New York clearing-house has several times acted toward its members in times of panic, by the issue of clearing-house certificates,--a quasi-money that helped them in time of need. The government would not be subject to the limitations of the clearing-house, however. The money it loaned would be, unlike clearing-house certificates, a legal tender everywhere; and the protection would extend to all the banks of the country. The government would act toward the banks in somewhat the same way as they act toward individuals, or as the Bank of England acts towards the other English banks, as a sort of reserve agent. In this case, however, the resources as to money would be unlimited. In the manner of regulating the volume of money, also, this plan would resemble that of the Bank of England, since that institution attempts in a feeble way, and prompted doubtless by self-interest, to regulate the volume of money, to some extent, by raising the discount rate when the volume is decreasing, as evidenced by exports of gold, and lowering the rate when gold is being imported. If it were impossible or inexpedient to loan in the above manner all the money the country required, a sufficient amount could be so loaned as to give an absolute control of the volume, and to regulate its value at all times, and the balance could be issued in exchange for the present greenbacks, and for interest-bearing bonds of the government, thus converting a part of the interest-bearing debt into a permanent non-interest-bearing one.