It is evident that the control of such a system should rest with the government, and not be left to any banking institution; for a bank would be more influenced by considerations of profit than of proper control in the interests of all. The interest received by the government would be a minor consideration, the control of the volume being the main object, and the rate of interest a means merely to that end. The people, besides, would have at all times a greater confidence in notes issued directly by the government than they could have in notes issued by any bank, however strong. The department of the government to be charged with this issuing function should, of course, be entirely distinct and separate from the other departments. Its sole business should be the maintenance of an honest money. It should have no connection with the general expenditures of the government, further than to pay into the Treasury such profits, in the way of interest, as might be received. The government expenses should be met, as they now are, by the receipts from taxes and duties, or, if these were insufficient at any time, by borrowing money on its bonds. Under no circumstances should money from the issuing department ever be taken for the expenses of government, except in the same way that banks or individuals might receive it, and never then to an extent that would raise average prices. The legal tender provision of the notes would be necessary only as specifying the medium in which payment of debts should be made, to prevent misunderstanding, and for the protection of debtor and creditor alike. The new dollar being a quantity of value, and not of a specified commodity, a loan might be returned in any commodity of that value but for some such provision. The provision could in no case wrong a creditor, for what he would receive in payment of the debt would be a positive guarantee to deliver him the _value_ specified in any commodity he chose. Making the money redeemable in any of the commodities on which it is based would be only a form, and might be omitted; it is suggested merely as obviating any objections to an irredeemable money. Of course the government would never be called upon to so redeem money, since the holder of it could exchange it for the commodity wanted in the open market to equal advantage. No reserve of commodities of any kind need be kept, therefore, for redemption purposes. One great difference between this plan and existing systems will, of course, be seen at once: the present system promises a definite amount of gold, and must, therefore, keep a gold reserve; but as no one really wants the gold, except to exchange for commodities, this plan proposes to do away with the necessity for a gold reserve by guaranteeing that the money can be directly exchanged for such commodities at the current market price,--which is all that can be done with the gold,--and that the average purchasing power of such money shall not vary as gold does.