Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 1: Complete Works, Volume SixNietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
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Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 1: Complete Works, Volume Six
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
Human beings
Man is not equally moral at all hours, this is well known. If his
morality is judged to be the capability for great self-sacrificing
resolutions and self-denial (which, when continuous and grown habitual,
are called holiness), he is most moral in the _passions;_ the higher
emotion provides him with entirely new motives, of which he, sober
and cold as usual, perhaps does not even believe himself capable. How
does this happen? Probably because of the proximity of everything
great and highly exciting; if man is once wrought up to a state of
extraordinary suspense, he is as capable of carrying out a terrible
revenge as of a terrible crushing of his need for revenge. Under the
influence of powerful emotion, he desires in any case the great, the
powerful, the immense; and if he happens to notice that the sacrifice
of himself satisfies him as well as, or better than, the sacrifice
of others, he chooses that. Actually, therefore, he only cares about
discharging his emotion; in order to ease his tension he seizes the
enemy's spears and buries them in his breast. That there was something
great in self-denial and not in revenge had to be taught to mankind by
long habit; a Godhead that sacrificed itself was the strongest, most
effective symbol of this kind of greatness. As the conquest of the most
difficult enemy, the sudden mastering of an affection--thus this denial
_appears_; and so far it passes for the summit of morality. In reality
it is a question of the confusion of one idea with another, while the
temperament maintains an equal height, an equal level. Temperate men
who are resting from their passions no longer understand the morality
of those moments; but the general admiration of those who had the same
experiences upholds them; pride is their consolation when affection
and the understanding of their deed vanish. Therefore, at bottom even
those actions of self-denial are not moral, inasmuch as they are not
done strictly with regard to others; rather the other only provides
the highly-strung temperament with an opportunity of relieving itself
through that denial.
139.
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