Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
Human beings
THE MORALITY OF PITY IN THE MOUTHS OF THE INTEMPERATE.—All those who are
not sufficiently masters of themselves and do not know morality as a
self-control and self-conquest continuously exercised in things great and
small, unconsciously come to glorify the good, compassionate, benevolent
impulses of that instinctive morality which has no head, but seems merely
to consist of a heart and helpful hands. It is to their interest even to
cast suspicion upon a morality of reason and to set up the other as the
sole morality.
46.
SEWERS OF THE SOUL.—Even the soul must have its definite sewers, through
which it can allow its filth to flow off: for this purpose it may use
persons, relations, social classes, its native country, or the world, or
finally—for the wholly arrogant (I mean our modern “pessimists”)—_le bon
Dieu_.
47.
A KIND OF REST AND CONTEMPLATION.—Beware lest your rest and contemplation
resemble that of a dog before a butcher’s stall, prevented by fear from
advancing and by greed from retiring, and opening its eyes wide as though
they were mouths.
48.
PROHIBITIONS WITHOUT REASONS.—A prohibition, the reason of which we do not
understand or admit, is almost a command, not only for the stiff-necked
but for the thirster after knowledge. We at once make an experiment in
order to learn _why_ the prohibition was made. Moral prohibitions, like
those of the Decalogue, are only suited to ages when reason lies
vanquished. Nowadays a prohibition like “Thou shalt not kill,” “Thou shalt
not commit adultery,” laid down without reasons, would have an injurious
rather than a beneficial effect.
49.
CHARACTER PORTRAIT.—What sort of a man is it that can say of himself: “I
despise very easily, but never hate. I at once find out in every man
something which can be honoured and for which I honour him: the so-called
amiable qualities attract me but little”?
50.
PITY AND CONTEMPT.—The expression of pity is regarded as a sign of
contempt, because one has clearly ceased to be an object of _fear_ as soon
as one becomes an object of pity. One has sunk below the level of the
equilibrium. For this equilibrium does not satisfy human vanity, which is
only satisfied by the feeling that one is imposing respect and awe. Hence
it is difficult to explain why pity is so highly prized, just as we need
to explain why the unselfish man, who is originally despised or feared as
being artful, is praised.
51.
THE CAPACITY OF BEING SMALL.—We must be as near to flowers, grasses, and
butterflies as a child, that is, not much bigger than they. We adults have
grown up beyond them and have to stoop to them. I think the grasses hate
us when we confess our love for them.—He who would have a share in all
good things must understand at times how to be small.
52.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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