Human Nature and Conduct: An introduction to social psychologyDewey, John
Philosophy
Human Nature and Conduct: An introduction to social psychology
Dewey, John
Habit; Social psychology
There is no difference in this respect between a visible course of
conduct and one proposed in deliberation. We have no direct
consciousness of what we purpose to do. We can judge its nature, assign
its meaning, only by following it into the situations whither it leads,
noting the objects against which it runs and seeing how they rebuff or
unexpectedly encourage it. In imagination as in fact we know a road only
by what we see as we travel on it. Moreover the objects which prick out
the course of a proposed act until we can see its design also serve to
direct eventual overt activity. Every object hit upon as the habit
traverses its imaginary path has a direct effect upon existing
activities. It reinforces, inhibits, redirects habits already working or
stirs up others which had not previously actively entered in. In thought
as well as in overt action, the objects experienced in following out a
course of action attract, repel, satisfy, annoy, promote and retard.
Thus deliberation proceeds. To say that at last it ceases is to say that
choice, decision, takes place.
What then is choice? Simply hitting in imagination upon an object which
furnishes an adequate stimulus to the recovery of overt action. Choice
is made as soon as some habit, or some combination of elements of habits
and impulse, finds a way fully open. Then energy is released. The mind
is made up, composed, unified. As long as deliberation pictures shoals
or rocks or troublesome gales as marking the route of a contemplated
voyage, deliberation goes on. But when the various factors in action fit
harmoniously together, when imagination finds no annoying hindrance,
when there is a picture of open seas, filled sails and favoring winds,
the voyage is definitely entered upon. This decisive direction of action
constitutes choice. It is a great error to suppose that we have no
preferences until there is a choice. We are always biased beings,
tending in one direction rather than another. The occasion of
deliberation is an _excess_ of preferences, not natural apathy or an
absence of likings. We want things that are incompatible with one
another; therefore we have to make a choice of what we _really_ want, of
the course of action, that is, which most fully releases activities.
Choice is not the emergence of preference out of indifference. It is the
emergence of a unified preference out of competing preferences. Biases
that had held one another in check now, temporarily at least, reinforce
one another, and constitute a unified attitude. The moment arrives when
imagination pictures an objective consequence of action which supplies
an adequate stimulus and releases definitive action. All deliberation is
a search for a _way_ to act, not for a final terminus. Its office is to
facilitate stimulation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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