Human Nature and Conduct: An introduction to social psychologyDewey, John
Philosophy
Human Nature and Conduct: An introduction to social psychology
Dewey, John
Habit; Social psychology
about man's affairs. Completion of the scientific change begun in the
seventeenth century thus depends upon a revision of the current notion
of ends of action as fixed limits and conclusions.
In fact, ends are ends-in-view or aims. They arise out of natural
effects or consequences which in the beginning are hit upon, stumbled
upon so far as any purpose is concerned. Men _like_ some of the
consequences and _dislike_ others. Henceforth (or till attraction and
repulsion alter) attaining or averting similar consequences are aims or
ends. These consequences constitute the meaning and value of an activity
as it comes under deliberation. Meantime of course imagination is busy.
Old consequences are enhanced, recombined, modified in imagination.
Invention operates. Actual consequences, that is effects which have
happened in the past, become possible future consequences of acts still
to be performed. This operation of imaginative thought complicates the
relation of ends to activity, but it does not alter the substantial
fact: Ends are foreseen consequences which arise in the course of
activity and which are employed to give activity added meaning and to
direct its further course. They are in no sense ends _of_ action. In
being ends of _deliberation_ they are redirecting pivots _in_ action.
Men shoot and throw. At first this is done as an "instinctive" or
natural reaction to some situation. The result when it is observed gives
a new meaning to the activity. Henceforth men in throwing and shooting
think of it in terms of its outcome; they act intelligently or have an
end. Liking the activity in its acquired meaning, they not only "take
aim" when they throw instead of throwing at random, but they find or
make targets at which to aim. This is the origin and nature of "goals"
of action. They are ways of defining and deepening the meaning of
activity. Having an end or aim is thus a characteristic of _present_
activity. It is the means by which an activity becomes adapted when
otherwise it would be blind and disorderly, or by which it gets meaning
when otherwise it would be mechanical. In a strict sense an end-in-view
is a _means_ in present action; present action is not a means to a
remote end. Men do not shoot because targets exist, but they set up
targets in order that throwing and shooting may be more effective and
significant.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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