Human Nature and Conduct: An introduction to social psychologyDewey, John
Philosophy
Human Nature and Conduct: An introduction to social psychology
Dewey, John
Habit; Social psychology
Why, indeed, acknowledge the authority of Right? That many persons do
not acknowledge it in fact, in action, and that all persons ignore it at
times, is assumed by the argument. Just what is the significance of an
alleged recognition of a supremacy which is continually denied in fact?
How much would be lost if it were dropped out, and we were left face to
face with actual facts? If a man lived alone in the world there might be
some sense in the question "Why be moral?" were it not for one thing: No
such question would then arise. As it is, we live in a world where other
persons live too. Our acts affect them. They perceive these effects, and
react upon us in consequence. Because they are living beings they make
demands upon us for certain things from us. They approve and
condemn--not in abstract theory but in what they do to us. The answer to
the question "Why not put your hand in the fire?" is the answer of fact.
If you do your hand will be burnt. The answer to the question why
acknowledge the right is of the same sort. For Right is only an abstract
name for the multitude of concrete demands in action which others
impress upon us, and of which we are obliged, if we would live, to take
some account. Its authority is the exigency of their demands, the
efficacy of their insistencies. There may be good ground for the
contention that in theory the idea of the right is subordinate to that
of the good, being a statement of the course proper to attain good. But
in fact it signifies the totality of social pressures exercised upon us
to induce us to think and desire in certain ways. Hence the right can in
fact become the road to the good only as the elements that compose this
unremitting pressure are enlightened, only as social relationships
become themselves reasonable.
It will be retorted that all pressure is a non-moral affair partaking of
force, not of right; that right must be ideal. Thus we are invited to
enter again the circle in which the ideal has no force and social
actualities no ideal quality. We refuse the invitation because social
pressure is involved in our own lives, as much so as the air we breathe
and the ground we walk upon. If we had desires, judgments, plans, in
short a mind, apart from social connections, then the latter would be
external and their action might be regarded as that of a non-moral
force. But we live mentally as physically only _in_ and _because_ of our
environment. Social pressure is but a name for the interactions which
are always going on and in which we participate, living so far as we
partake and dying so far as we do not. The pressure is not ideal but
empirical, yet empirical here means only actual. It calls attention to
the fact that considerations of right are claims originating not outside
of life, but within it. They are "ideal" in precisely the degree in
which we intelligently recognize and act upon them, just as colors and
canvas become ideal when used in ways that give an added meaning to
life.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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