Human Nature and Conduct: An introduction to social psychologyDewey, John
Philosophy
Human Nature and Conduct: An introduction to social psychology
Dewey, John
Habit; Social psychology
The fallacy is obvious. Because an animal cannot live except as it is
alive, except that is as its acts have the result of sustaining life, it
is concluded that all its acts are instigated by an impulse to
self-preservation. Since all acts affect the well-being of their agent
in one way or another, and since when a person becomes reflective he
prefers consequences in the way of weal to those of woe, therefore all
his acts are due to self-love. In actual substance, one statement says
that life is life; and the other says that a self is a self. One says
that special acts are acts of a living creature and the other that they
are acts of a self. In the biological statement the concrete diversity
between the acts of say a clam and of a dog are covered up by pointing
out that the acts of each tend to self-preservation, ignoring the
somewhat important fact that in one case it is the life of a clam and in
the other the life of a dog which is continued. In morals, the concrete
differences between a Jesus, a Peter, a John and a Judas are covered up
by the wise remark that after all they are all selves and all act as
selves. In every case, a result or "end" is treated as an actuating
cause.
The fallacy consists in transforming the (truistic) fact of acting _as_
a self into the fiction of acting always _for_ self. Every act,
truistically again, tends to a certain fulfilment or satisfaction of
some habit which is an undoubted element in the structure of character.
Each satisfaction is qualitatively what it is because of the disposition
fulfilled in the object attained, treachery or loyalty, mercy or
cruelty. But theory comes in and blankets the tremendous diversity in
the quality of the satisfactions which are experienced by pointing out
that they are all satisfactions. The harm done is then completed by
transforming this artificial unity of result into an original love of
satisfaction as the force that generates all acts alike. Because a Nero
and a Peabody both get satisfaction in acting as they do it is inferred
that the satisfaction of each is the same in quality, and that both were
actuated by love of the same objective. In reality the more we
concretely dwell upon the common fact of fulfilment, the more we realize
the difference in the kinds of selves fulfilled. In pointing out that
both the north and the south poles are poles we do not abolish the
difference of north from south; we accentuate it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account