Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
As regards intentional imposture, it may be said in general that all men
are subject to be duped in matters of which they have no working
knowledge and which appeal strongly to the emotions. The application of
this principle to quack medicine, to commercial swindles, and to the
ever-reappearing impostures relating to supposed communication with
spirits, is too plain to be enlarged upon. While it is an advantage,
even to a charlatan, to believe in himself, the susceptibility of a
large part of us to be duped by quacks of one sort or another is obvious
enough, and shows that the work of free institutions in developing
shrewdness is by no means complete.
Probably a close and candid consideration of the matter would lead to
the conclusion that everyone is something of an impostor, that we all
pose more or less, under the impulse to produce a desired impression
upon others. As social and imaginative beings we must set store by our
appearance; and it is hardly possible to do so without in some degree
adapting that appearance to the impression we wish to make. It is only
when this adaptation takes the form of deliberate and injurious deceit
that much fault can be found with it. “We all,” says Stevenson in his
essay on Pepys, “whether we write or speak, must somewhat drape
ourselves when we address our fellows; at a given moment we apprehend
our character and acts by some particular side; we are merry with one,
grave with another, as befits the nature and demands of the relation.”
If we never tried to seem a little better than we are, how could we
improve or “train ourselves from the outside inward”? And the same
impulse to show the world a better or idealized aspect of ourselves
finds an organized expression in the various professions and classes,
each of which has to some extent a cant or pose, which its members
assume unconsciously, for the most part, but which has the effect of a
conspiracy to work upon the credulity of the rest of the world. There is
a cant not only of theology and of philanthropy, but also of law,
medicine, teaching, even of science—perhaps especially of science, just
now, since the more a particular kind of merit is recognized and
admired, the more it is likely to be assumed by the unworthy. As
theology goes down and science comes up, the affectation of
disinterestedness and of exactness in method tends to supplant the
affectation of piety.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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