Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
Egoism can be identified with wrong only when we mean by it some narrow
or unstable phase of the self; and altruism, if we take it to mean
susceptibility to be impressed by other people, is equally wrong when
it, in turn, becomes narrow or unstable, as we see it in hysterical
persons. As I have already said, I hold altruism, when used, as it seems
to be ordinarily, to denote a supposed peculiar class of impulses,
separate from another supposed class called egoistic, to be a mere
fiction, engendered by the vaguely material idea of personality just
mentioned. Most higher kinds of thought are altruistic, in the sense
that they involve a more or less distinct reference to other persons;
but when intensely conceived, these same kinds of thought are usually,
if not always, self-thoughts, or egoistic, as well.
The question whether a man shall keep his dollar or give it to a beggar,
for example, looks at first sight like a question of ego _versus_ alter,
because there are two physical bodies present and visibly associated
with the conflicting impulses. In this merely physical sense, of
referring to one material body rather than another, it is in fact such a
question, but not necessarily in any properly mental, social, or moral
sense.
Let us look at the matter a moment with reference to various possible
meanings of the words altruism and altruistic. Taking the latter word as
the most convenient for our purpose, I can think of three meanings, any
one of which would answer well enough to the vague current usage of it:
first, that which is suggested by another person, that is by his
appearance, words, or other symbols; second, that which is for the
benefit of another; third, good or moral.
In the first sense, which carries no moral implication at all, it is
altruistic to give to the beggar, but the word is also applicable to the
greater part of our actions, since most of them are suggested by others
in some way. And, of course, many of the actions included are what are
generally called selfish ones. To strike a man with whom we are angry,
to steal from one of whom we are envious, to take liberties with an
attractive woman, and all sorts of reprehensible proceedings suggested
by the sight of another person, would be altruistic in this sense, which
I suppose, therefore, cannot be the one intended by those who use the
word as the antithesis to egoistic.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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