Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
but it is hardly possible or desirable to maintain this attitude
continuously. Universal sympathy is impracticable; what we need is
better control and selection, avoiding both the narrowness of our class
and the dissipation of promiscuous impressions. It is well for a man to
open out and take in as much of life as he can organize into a
consistent whole, but to go beyond that is not desirable. In a time of
insistent suggestion, like the present, it is fully as important to many
of us to know when and how to restrict the impulses of sympathy as it is
to avoid narrowness. And this is in no way inconsistent, I think, with
that modern democracy of sentiment—also connected with the enlargement
of communication—which deprecates the limitation of sympathy by wealth
or position. Sympathy must be selective, but the less it is controlled
by conventional and external circumstances, such as wealth, and the more
it penetrates to the essentials, of character, the better. It is this
liberation from convention, locality, and chance, I think, that the
spirit of the time calls for.
Again, the life of this age is more diversified than life ever was
before, and this appears in the mind of the person who shares it as a
greater variety of interests and affiliations. A man may be regarded as
the point of intersection of an indefinite number of circles
representing social groups, having as many arcs passing through him as
there are groups. This diversity is connected with the growth of
communication, and is another phase of the general enlargement and
variegation of life. Because of the greater variety of imaginative
contacts it is impossible for a normally open-minded individual not to
lead a broader life, in some respects at least, than he would have led
in the past. Why is it, for instance, that such ideas as brotherhood and
the sentiment of equal right are now so generally extended to all
classes of men? Primarily, I think, because all classes have become
imaginable, by acquiring power and means of expression. He whom I
imagine without antipathy becomes my brother. If we feel that we must
give aid to another, it is because that other lives and strives in our
imaginations, and so is a part of ourselves. The shallow separation of
self and other in common speech obscures the extreme simplicity and
naturalness of such feelings. If I come to imagine a person suffering
wrong it is not “altruism” that makes me wish to right that wrong, but
simple human impulse. He is my life, as really and immediately as
anything else. His symbol arouses a sentiment which is no more his than
mine.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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