Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
Although the topic of the self is regarded as an abstruse one this
abstruseness belongs chiefly, perhaps, to the metaphysical discussion of
the “pure ego”—whatever that may be—while the empirical self should not
be very much more difficult to get hold of than other facts of the mind.
At any rate, it may be assumed that the pronouns of the first person
have a substantial, important, and not very recondite meaning, otherwise
they would not be in constant and intelligible use by simple people and
young children the world over. And since they have such a meaning why
should it not be observed and reflected upon like any other matter of
fact? As to the underlying mystery, it is no doubt real, important, and
a very fit subject of discussion by those who are competent, but I do
not see that it is a _peculiar_ mystery. I mean that it seems to be
simply a phase of the general mystery of life, not pertaining to “I”
more than to any other personal or social fact; so that here as
elsewhere those who are not attempting to penetrate the mystery may
simply ignore it. If this is a just view of the matter, “I” is merely a
fact like any other.
The distinctive thing in the idea for which the pronouns of the first
person are names is apparently a characteristic kind of feeling which
may be called the my-feeling or sense of appropriation. Almost any sort
of ideas may be associated with this feeling, and so come to be named
“I” or “mine,” but the feeling, and that alone it would seem, is the
determining factor in the matter. As Professor James says in his
admirable discussion of the self, the words “me” and “self” designate
“all the things which have the power to produce in a stream of
consciousness excitement of a certain peculiar sort.”[37] This view is
very fully set forth by Professor Hiram M. Stanley, whose work, “The
Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling,” has an extremely suggestive chapter
on self-feeling.
I do not mean that the feeling aspect of the self is necessarily more
important than any other, but that it is the immediate and decisive sign
and proof of what “I” is; there is no appeal from it; if we go behind it
it must be to study its history and conditions, not to question its
authority. But, of course, this study of history and conditions may be
quite as profitable as the direct contemplation of self-feeling. What I
would wish to do is to present each aspect in its proper light.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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