Humanistic Studies of the University of Kansas, Vol. 1Mitchell, Arthur
Philosophy
Humanistic Studies of the University of Kansas, Vol. 1
Mitchell, Arthur
Humanities
The anti-intellectualist doctrine, however, that data of consciousness
cannot be understood, conceptualized, defined, or even named--cannot,
in short, be objectified--without contradiction is as important for the
problem of knowledge as it is for the problem of freedom. Professor
Perry’s analysis of immediatism[145] shows the misunderstanding of
what it is to conceptualize, which underlies such a doctrine. The
anti-intellectualist idea seems to be that the concept is static,
and common to more than one consciousness, and universal in its
denotation, and sharply discrete; and that for these reasons it could
not correspond to what is fluid and private and uniquely particular
and continuous. It is evidently the “copy theory” of knowledge, which
unconsciously determines this criticism of the concept. Concepts
are invalid, applied to life, _because they are not like living
objects_! “You cannot make continuous being out of discontinuities,”
is James’s criticism.[146] And Bergson’s: “Instead of a flux of
fleeting shades merging into each other [intellect] perceives distinct
and, so to speak, _solid_ colors, set side by side like the beads of
a necklace.”[147] But, as Perry shows, to conceptualize is nothing
like this procedure. Conception is _substitution_ of one object of
immediate consciousness which is conveniently abstract, for another
object which is, in the circumstances of the conceiving, inconvenient
in its concrete fulness. All that is necessary in order that this
substitutional mode of consciousness should be valid and true
knowledge of the object so symbolized, is that the substitute should
_mean_ that object. And that it can and does mean it when the object
is a subjective state is no more than the fact that, on Bergson’s
own showing, such states are symbolized. For to mean is essentially
to symbolize. Certainly no one concept is a rounded-out exhaustive
awareness, so to speak, of the symbolized object. But this is no more
than to say that conceiving is a selective and eliminating mode of
consciousness--which does not distinguish it from any other mode, the
most immediate and intuitive possible state of genuine significant
consciousness being essentially as much an elimination as a positing.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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