Humanistic Studies of the University of Kansas, Vol. 1Mitchell, Arthur
Philosophy
Humanistic Studies of the University of Kansas, Vol. 1
Mitchell, Arthur
Humanities
Aristippus the Cyrenaic are two of the least unifying philosophers
of history; yet their philosophy, like that of any absolutist, can be
resumed in a single idea. Omar has uttered it in one of his own famous
sentences: “Oh take the cash, and let the credit go!”
Aside from the presence, in each, of a generative principle, there
is little enough in common between the anti-intellectualism of Omar
and that of Henri Bergson. If critics have been able to find seeds of
skepticism and of pessimism in Bergson,[95] these characters are at any
rate foreign to any intention visible in its author. No more positive
philosophy, in its intention, was ever composed. The positiveness of
its name, intuitionism, is altogether proper. Its significance, to be
sure, is sharply defined by its negative relation to intellectualism,
and therefore I stated it negatively above as the thesis that the parts
of reality are not connected in a thinkable way. But the intuitionist
would readily admit: if not in a thinkable way, then in no way,
evidently. And, again, if not connected at all, no more are the parts
of reality disconnected, since any disconnection between things is
only their particular mode of connection. The fact is, reality has no
parts, and that is just why intellect, which sees parts in everything,
is alien and blind to the true nature of reality. Still one may object
that intellect is itself a fact. What possible meaning can there be in
saying that any fact is alien to reality? As Bergson himself has said,
we swim in reality, and cannot possibly get clear of it. We cannot
talk, we cannot think, we cannot act about nothing.
The answer to this objection is the master principle of Bergson’s
metaphysics: reality is life. Knowledge is “sympathetic” living. If
intellect is real, so is every abstraction, _e. g._, the inside of your
hat. The inside and the hat itself are at any rate real in senses so
importantly different that “real” and “unreal” hardly exaggerate the
contrast. Intellect, says Bergson, is the cross-sectioning of reality.
There is no thickness, no concreteness in it. It exists as much in
inert matter as in consciousness; in fact, it exists in neither except
in the sense in which a surface can be said to exist in a solid body.
What is the surface _in itself_? Why, nothing; it is an abstract aspect
of the body. The body is real, but its aspects are not real, because
they do not constitute the body--no multiplication or addition of them
does so. No millions of surfaces make any thickness. In this sense the
surface is other than and alien to the real nature of the body. And so
other manifestations of intellect--space, juxtaposition, extension,
number, part out of part--have no existence, as the surface has none.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account