Humanistic Studies of the University of Kansas, Vol. 1Mitchell, Arthur
Philosophy
Humanistic Studies of the University of Kansas, Vol. 1
Mitchell, Arthur
Humanities
This statement of the case will satisfy few people as it stands.
Professor Bergson is aware of this, and he will grant that such alleged
facts of consciousness as you distinguish and count may be set in the
medium of time rather than in space, if time, as well as space, is
a homogeneous medium; but time so understood, he thinks, turns into
space. And time is so understood very generally, without any doubt.
When we speak of time, says Bergson, we are usually thinking of space;
that is, we are thinking of a homogeneous medium, a medium, therefore,
in which psychic states are aligned or juxtaposited, as things are in
space, forming a distinct multiplicity.
This is, of course, another aspect of what Bergson regards as the same
vice, conceptualism, that is discussed in the first chapter of the
_Essai_. An intensive magnitude is a distinct concept, sharply bounded;
all within is the concept, all without, its other. But no psychic fact
is sharply bounded; it penetrates the whole consciousness. The whole
consciousness is one with it. We work quantitatively with concepts,
always, arithmetically and geometrically. But then we work in space,
which is enough, says Bergson, to show that intensity applied to a
psychic fact is not a magnitude, since psychic facts are not in space.
So here, in the second chapter, the elements which one pretends to
count and add _in time_ are, in order to be counted and added--in order
merely to be distinguished--distinct concepts. Then they are not in
time but in space.
The application of intensive magnitude and of numerical multiplicity to
psychic facts is thus the same fallacy in two aspects, the fallacy of
conceptualism, the nature of which is to substitute space for time as
the form of mental existence.
But Professor Bergson is not altogether dogmatic in saying that
conceptual time is a spatialized symbol of real time. He goes on now to
show how it is that the nature of real time is nothing like conceptual
time. _Durée_, his name for real time, seems a bad term for such a use;
for the essence of Bergson’s “_durée_” is change, while duration in
every other connection means just the waiting or standing still of the
flow of time. Some term like “lapse” seems nearer the idea.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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