We shall conclude this subject with observing the falsehood of the
common opinion that no large state, such as France or Britain,
could ever be modelled into a commonwealth, but that such a form
of government can only take place in a city or small territory.
The contrary seems evident. Though it is more difficult to form a
republican government in an extensive country than in a city, there
is more facility, when once it is formed, of preserving it steady and
uniform, without tumult and faction. It is not easy for the distant
parts of a large state to combine in any plan of free government; but
they easily conspire in the esteem and reverence of a single
person, who, by means of this popular favour, may seize the power,
and forcing the more obstinate to submit, may establish a monarchical
government. On the other hand, a city readily concurs in the same
notions of government, the natural equality of property favours
liberty, and the nearness of habitation enables the citizens mutually
to assist each other. Even under absolute princes the subordinate
government of cities is commonly republican; while that of counties
and provinces is monarchical. But these same circumstances, which
facilitate the erection of commonwealths in cities, render their
constitution more frail and uncertain. Democracies are turbulent. For
however the people may be separated or divided into small parties,
either in their votes or elections, their near habitation in a
city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very
sensible. Aristocracies are better adapted for peace and order, and
accordingly were most admired by ancient writers; but they are jealous
and oppressive. In a large government, which is modelled with masterly
skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy from
the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first
concoction of the commonwealth to the higher magistrates who direct all
the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote
that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion,
to hurry them into any measures against the public interest.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account