In all the politics of Greece the anxiety with regard to the balance of power is most apparent, and is expressly pointed out to us even by the ancient historians. Thucydides represents the league which was formed against Athens, and which produced the Peloponnesian war, as entirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of Athens, when the Thebans and Lacedemonians disputed for sovereignty, we find that the Athenians (as well as many other republics) threw themselves always into the lighter scale, and endeavoured to preserve the balance. They supported Thebes against Sparta, till the great victory gained by Epaminondas at Leuctra, after which they immediately went over to the conquered, from generosity as they pretended, but in reality from their jealousy of the conquerors. Whoever will read Demosthenes’ oration for the Megalopolitans may see the utmost refinements on this principle which ever entered into the head of a Venetian or English speculatist; and upon the first rise of the Macedonian power, this orator immediately discovered the danger, sounded the alarm through all Greece, and at last assembled that confederacy under the banners of Athens which fought the great and decisive battle of Chæronea. It is true the Grecian wars are regarded by historians as wars of emulation rather than of politics, and each state seems to have had more in view the honour of leading the rest than any well-grounded hopes of authority and dominion. If we consider, indeed, the small number of inhabitants in any one republic compared to the whole, the great difficulty of forming sieges in those times, and the extraordinary bravery and discipline of every freeman among that noble people, we shall conclude that the balance of power was of itself sufficiently secured in Greece, and needed not to be guarded with that caution which may be requisite in other ages. But whether we ascribe the shifting sides in all the Grecian republics to jealous emulation or cautious politics, the effects were alike, and every prevailing power was sure to meet with a confederacy against it, and that often composed of its former friends and allies. The same principle—call it envy or prudence—which produced the ostracism of Athens and petalism of Syracuse, and expelled every citizen whose fame or power overtopped the rest—the same principle, I say, naturally discovered itself in foreign politics, and soon raised enemies to the leading state, however moderate in the exercise of its authority.