Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life: Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not been noticed by any editorIamblichus
Philosophy
Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life: Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not been noticed by any editor
Iamblichus
Ethics, Ancient; Philosophers -- Greece -- Biography; Philosophy, Ancient; Pythagoras; Pythagoras and Pythagorean school
indeed, are not all the Pythagoreans, but of all of them they are the
most famous.[56]]
But the most illustrious Pythagorean women are Timycha, the wife of
Myllias the Crotonian. Philtis, the daughter of Theophrius the
Crotonian, Byndacis, the sister of Ocellus and Occillus, Lucanians.
Chilonis, the daughter of Chilon the Lacedæmonian. Cratesiclea the
Lacedæmonian, the wife of Cleanor the Lacedæmonian. Theano, the wife of
Brontinus of Metapontum. Mya, the wife of Milon the Crotonian. Lasthenia
the Arcadian. Abrotelia, the daughter of Abroteles the Tarentine.
Echecratia the Phliasian. Tyrsenis, the Sybarite. Pisirrhonde, the
Tarentine. Nisleadusa, the Lacedæmonian. Bryo, the Argive. Babelyma, the
Argive. And Cleæchma, the sister of Autocharidas the Lacedæmonian. In
all seventeen.
FRAGMENTS
OF THE
ETHICAL WRITINGS
OF CERTAIN
PYTHAGOREANS.
FROM
HIPPODAMUS, THE THURIAN,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON FELICITY.
Of animals, some are the recipients of felicity, but others are
incapable of receiving it. And those animals, indeed, are receptive of
it that have reason. For felicity cannot subsist without virtue; and
virtue is first ingenerated in that which possesses reason. But those
animals are incapable of receiving felicity, that are destitute of
reason. For neither can that which is deprived of sight, receive the
work or the virtue of sight; nor can that which is destitute of reason,
be the recipient of the work, or the virtue of that which possesses
reason. With respect to felicity, however, and virtue, the former is as
a work, but the latter as a certain art, to that which possesses reason.
But of animals which possess reason, some are self-perfect, and these
are such as are perfect through themselves, and are indigent of nothing
external, either to their existence, or to their existing well and
beautifully. And such, indeed, is God. Those animals, however, are not
self-perfect, which are not perfect through themselves, but are in want
of external causes to their perfection. And man is an animal of this
kind. Of animals, therefore, which are not self-perfect, some indeed are
perfect, but others are not perfect. And those indeed are perfect which
derive their subsistence both from their own [proper] causes, and from
external causes. And they derive it indeed from their own causes,
because they obtain from thence both an excellent nature and deliberate
choice; but from external causes, because they receive from thence
equitable legislation and good rulers. But the animals which are not
perfect, are either such as participate of neither of these, or of some
one of these, or whose souls are entirely depraved. And such will the
man be who is of a description different from the above.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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