Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life: Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not been noticed by any editorIamblichus
Philosophy
Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life: Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not been noticed by any editor
Iamblichus
Ethics, Ancient; Philosophers -- Greece -- Biography; Philosophy, Ancient; Pythagoras; Pythagoras and Pythagorean school
For continence consists in subduing, and incontinence in
not subduing pleasures. And ferocity pertains to the irascible part of
the soul. For when some one, through acting ill from desire, is
gratified not as a man should be, but as a wild beast, then a thing of
this kind is denominated ferocity. The effects also of these
dispositions are consequent to the things for the sake of which they are
performed. For avarice is consequent to vice; but vice is consequent to
the reasoning part of the soul. And ambition, indeed, follows from the
irascible part; and this becoming excessive, generates ferocity. Again,
pleasure pertains to the appetitive part; but this being sought after
more vehemently, generates incontinence. Hence, since the acting
unjustly is produced from so many causes, it is evident that acting
justly is effected through an equal number of causes. For virtue,
indeed, is naturally beneficent and profitable; but vice is productive
of evil, and is noxious.
Since, however, of the parts of the soul, one is the leader, but the
other follows, and the virtues and the vices subsist about these, and in
these; it is evident that with respect to the virtues also, some are
leaders, others are followers, and others, are composed from these. And
the leaders, indeed, are such as prudence; but the followers are such as
fortitude and temperance; and the composites from these, are such as
justice. The passions, however, are the matter of virtue; for the
virtues subsist about, and in these. But of the passions, one is
voluntary, but another is involuntary. And the voluntary, indeed, is
pleasure; but the involuntary is pain. Men also, who have the political
virtues, give intension and remission to these, co-harmonizing the other
parts of the soul, to that part which possesses reason. But the boundary
of this co-adaptation, is for intellect not to be prevented from
accomplishing its proper work, either by indigence, or excess. For that
which is less excellent, is co-arranged for the sake of that which is
more excellent. Thus in the world, every part that is always passive,
subsists for the sake of that which is always moved. And in the
conjunction of animals, the female subsists for the sake of the male.
For the latter sows, generating a soul; but the former alone imparts
matter to that which is generated. In the soul however, the irrational
subsists for the sake of the rational part. For anger and desire are
co-arranged in subserviency to the first part of the soul; the former as
a certain satellite, and guardian of the body; but the latter as a
dispensator and provident curator of necessary wants. But intellect
being established in the highest summit of the body, and having a
prospect in that which is on all sides splendid and transparent,[65]
investigates the wisdom of [real] beings. And this is the work of it
according to nature, viz. having investigated, and obtained the
possession [of truth] to follow those beings who are more excellent and
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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