Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life: Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not been noticed by any editorIamblichus
Philosophy
Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life: Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not been noticed by any editor
Iamblichus
Ethics, Ancient; Philosophers -- Greece -- Biography; Philosophy, Ancient; Pythagoras; Pythagoras and Pythagorean school
The principles of all virtue are three; knowledge, power, and deliberate
choice. And knowledge indeed, is that by which we contemplate and form a
judgment of things; power is as it were a certain strength of the
nature[69] from which we derive our subsistence, and is that which gives
stability to our actions; and deliberate choice is as it were certain
hands of the soul by which we are impelled to, and lay hold on the
objects of our choice. The order of the soul also subsists as follows:
One part of it is the reasoning power, another part is anger, and
another is desire. And the reasoning power indeed, is that which has
dominion over knowledge; anger is that which rules over the ardent
impulses of the soul; and desire is that which willingly rules over
appetite. When therefore, these three pass into one, so as to exhibit
one co-adaptation, then virtue and concord are produced in the soul; but
when they are seditious, and divulsed from each other, then vice and
discord are generated in the soul. And when the reasoning power prevails
over the irrational parts of the soul, then endurance and continence are
produced; endurance indeed, in the retention of pains; but continence in
the abstinence from pleasures. But when the irrational parts of the soul
prevail over the reasoning power, then effeminacy and incontinence are
produced; effeminacy indeed, in flying from pain; but incontinence, in
the being vanquished by pleasures. When however, the better part of the
soul governs, but the less excellent part is governed; and the former
leads, but the latter follows, and both consent, and are concordant with
each other, then virtue and every good are generated in the whole soul.
When likewise the appetitive follows the reasoning part of the soul,
then temperance is produced; but when this is the case with the
irascible part, fortitude is produced; and when it takes place in all
the parts of the soul, then justice is the result. For justice is that
which separates all the vices and all the virtues of the soul from each
other. And justice is a certain established order of the apt conjunction
of the parts of the soul, and perfect and supreme virtue. For every good
is contained in this; but the other goods of the soul cannot subsist
without this. Hence justice possesses great strength both among Gods and
men. For this virtue contains the bond by which the whole and the
universe are held together, and also by which Gods and men are
connected. Justice therefore, is said to be Themis among the celestial,
but Dice among the terrestrial Gods; and Law among men. These assertions
however, are indications and symbols, that justice is the supreme
virtue. Hence virtue, when it consists in contemplating and judging, is
called prudence; when in sustaining things of a dreadful nature, it is
denominated fortitude; when in restraining pleasure, temperance; and
when in abstaining from gain, and from injuring our neighbours, justice.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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