Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life: Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not been noticed by any editorIamblichus
Philosophy
Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life: Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not been noticed by any editor
Iamblichus
Ethics, Ancient; Philosophers -- Greece -- Biography; Philosophy, Ancient; Pythagoras; Pythagoras and Pythagorean school
I say that virtue will be found sufficient to the avoidance of
infelicity, and vice to the non-attainment of felicity, if we
judiciously consider the habits [by which these are produced]. For it is
necessary that the bad man should always be miserable; whether he is in
affluence, for he employs it badly; or whether he is in penury; just as
the blind man, whether he has light, and the most splendid visible
object before him, or whether he is in the dark [is always necessarily
without sight]. But the good man is not always happy; for felicity does
not consist in the possession, but in the use of virtue. For neither
does he who has sight always see; for he will not see, if he is without
light. Life, however, is divided into two paths; one of which is more
arduous, and in which the patient Ulysses walked; but the other is more
free from molestation, and is that in which Nestor proceeded. I say
therefore that virtue desires the latter, but is able to proceed in the
former of these paths. The nature however of felicity proclaims it to be
a desirable and stable life, because it gives perfection to the decision
of the soul. Hence the virtuous man who does not obtain such a life as
this, is not indeed happy, nor yet entirely miserable. No one therefore
will dare to say that the good man should be exempt from disease, and
pain, and sorrow. For as we leave certain painful things to the body, so
likewise we must permit them to be present with the soul. The sorrows,
however, of fools are most irrational; but those of wise men proceed
only as far as reason, which gives limitation to things, permits.
Moreover, the boast of apathy dissolves the generosity of virtue, when
it opposes itself to things of an indifferent nature, and not to evils
such as death, and pain, and poverty. For things which are not evils are
easily vanquished. We should therefore exercise ourselves in the
mediocrity of the passions, as we shall then equally avoid
insensibility, and too much passivity, and shall not speak higher of our
nature than we ought.
FROM
ARCHYTAS,
IN HIS TREATISE ON
THE GOOD AND HAPPY MAN.
I say then that the good man is one who uses in a beautiful manner great
things and opportunities. He likewise is able to bear well both
prosperity and adversity. In beautiful and honorable circumstances also,
he becomes worthy of the condition in which he is placed; and when his
fortune is changed, receives it in a proper manner. In short, on all
occasions, he contends well from contingencies that may arise. Nor does
he only thus prepare himself [for whatever may happen], but likewise
those who confide in and contend together with him.
FROM
CRITO,
IN HIS TREATISE ON
PRUDENCE AND PROSPERITY.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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