It is apparent from what has been said that Ibrahim’s diplomatic methods were not subtle; they had no need to be. As the diplomacy of the Porte was usually either the introduction to, or the conclusion of a military campaign, small wonder that it usually attained its object. As the favor of the Porte was eagerly sought by France, Venice, Poland, Russia, Hungary and Austria, it required no finesse of diplomatic handling to deal with their ambassadors. Ibrahim, holding all the trumps, needed no great skill to play his cards well. He might be as rude and boastful as he would, and still the ambassadors would beg for his influence in making peace. Both Suleiman and Ibrahim treated Charles V and Ferdinand with great haughtiness, nevertheless pursuing an entirely successful policy; France, on the other hand, playing a subtle game, won considerable from the Porte. It would seem that the test of Turkish diplomacy was not its method but its general plan and large lines. The question then before us is, what were the objects and accomplishments of Turkish diplomacy between 1525 and 1540. Suleiman had two objects, first to extend his conquering power further into Europe, and second to assist Francis I against the House of Hapsburg. In these two objects he was successful. His empire was greatly extended during his reign, both in territory and in influence, while the power of the rival House of Hapsburg was steadily diminished and limited. But that which makes of this period an epoch in European political history is not the territorial aggrandizement of Turkey, nor the recognition of its power by Europe, but the first entrance of Turkey into the European concert, if we may anticipate a later term, and the change from the consideration of the Turks as merely unbelievers and foes of Christianity to regarding them as political allies or foes, and as possible factors in the European question. At the close of the reign of Selim the Grim, Turkey, although it was a conquering nation, was still an excrescence in Europe. But the time had come when it must enter into the affairs of the Northern nations, and for that time Suleiman, unusually tolerant towards the West, with a great idea of the destiny of Turkey, and aided by his Christian grand vizir, was ready, and by the end of his reign he had made himself felt in every court on the continent, and had to be reckoned with in every European cabinet. But as a natural corollary to this fact, Turkey was never, after this time, wholly free from European influence. The fine wedge of French intervention was introduced by La Forest in the treaty of 1535, and conservative Turks of today look on Suleiman’s “capitulations” as the beginning of endless troubles for Turkey, while the French still rejoice over the triumphs of astute and far‐sighted Francis I. “Suleiman en sortant de son farouche isolement,” says Zeller, “François I^{_er_} en bravant les préventions de ses