And indeed, how would it be possible for the State of the Church, which is a Monarchy, to be governed well if it were governed as a Republick. For in Commonwealths the Governours are the Citizens and Natives themselves, who being sure that the State they govern, is their own, do administer with Justice and Equity; first, as reaping a benefit by their moderation; And secondly, as being sure to expect a punishment when they are out of their charges: But the _Pope_ having the disposing of all places and charges, does often advance Strangers; who have no design but of making their own Fortune, and who, when once removed from their dignities, may either leave the State, or else procure impunity by a part of those riches which they have extorted from the poor people. It is much better therefore that there should be a _Nipotismo_, into whose hands the _Popes_ may trust their Government and Person; and who by the purchase which they make of great Estates do, as it were, settle themselves within the State: and may fear the being called to an account for their violences, if they exceed measure. There are three other reasons which seem to conclude very strongly in favour of a _Nipotismo_, which are these: That the _Pope_ may more easily discover the interests of Foreign Princes; That he may be able to govern with more care and affection; And that he may be able to carry on the Negotiations of his Court with more secrecy. And indeed, it would not only be difficult, but almost impossible for the _Pope_ to dive into the hidden interests and designs of Foreign Princes without a _Nipotismo_; For how could he trust Strangers with his secrets, if he could not be assured that they would reciprocally reveal to him all theirs. The Ministers of State would be easily corrupted to betray the _Pope_ their Master, and incline much more to oblige Princes, upon whom, because of their hereditary and settled condition, they might relie, than to be faithful to one who might fail every moment; and with him all their hopes and expectations. Besides, the Princes themselves would hardly condescend to reveal their secrets, and treat of important matters in the Court of _Rome_, when they should know and see that they must confide in strangers, whom another Prince might bribe and corrupt to their disadvantage; For just so far do Soveraigns trust the _Pope_ as they see about him people, in whom he may trust himself. _Urban_ the eighth deserves no small praises for his Policy, all along his Reign: but particularly, for his method and way of treating with the Soveraigns of _Europe_; whose secrets were all revealed to him, whereas none of his were revealed to them again. For the same means, which he used to discover others designs, help him to conceal his own.