Indeed, the secresie of the Court of _Rome_ seems not to be so great as the subtilty, although Excommunications and Censures make a great noise: For those who are introduc’d into this Court are so only for two ends, either to exalt their Family, and support it from falling, (for the Ecclesiasticks, having no Wives, naturally encline to enrich their own Nephews) or else to aggrandise themselves, out of that ambition which alwaies lies under the Robes of Prelacy. The Cardinals, however sometimes vertuous and experienced persons, are not exempt from certain imperfections which commonly reign in _Rome_; for they are either oblig’d to Princes by a thousand benefices and gifts, or else are their natural Subjects: and for this reason the Princes who have great concerns with _Rome_, the more they see Authority and Offices of any Cardinal increas’d, the more they study how to oblige him to be at their devotion, and to withdraw him from that of the _Pope_. Now almost all the Cardinals reveal the things which they pretend to discover, either through the importunity of inquisitive Agents, and not to disoblige those to whom they are oblig’d, or else to put greater obligations upon the Princes to whom they are Pensioners, to the end they may receive gratuity after gratuity both to themselves and their Kindred, and especially that they may be assisted in their Pretensions to the Papacy, when the See Apostolical shall become vacant; which is the greatest spur of all. To this Embassadours trust, and alwaies treat with the Cardinals who are adherents to their Masters, to discover the Counsels by their means. But indeed, they deceive themselves; for the Cardinals being as much concern’d as the _Pope_ in the defense of the Church, the State, and the publick good, in regard all are in capacity to be _Popes_, they will never reveal any thing which may prejudice that Papacy which makes them great, and which they aim one day to govern. The Cardinals are not so indiscreet as to reveal any thing that may in any wise prejudice the Interests of the Papacy and Ecclesiastick State; they reveal such things as may be of prejudice to the single person of the _Pope_, or rather of his Nephews, whom commonly they hate through envy. The effect hereof is, that most _Popes_ put little trust in the Cardinals when any matter relating to their own House is in agitation, but they do all _motu proprio_: for themselves having, whilst they were Cardinals, revealed what they ought to have kept secret, they doubt, being afterwards _Popes_, that others do the like by them; and for this cause they secure themselves, as much as possible, from such dangers.