It must be confessed that our study has tended to bring home to the mind
the wide range of the illusory and unreal in our intellectual life. In
sense-perception, in the introspection of the mind's own feelings, in
the reading of others' feelings, in memory, and finally in belief, we
have found a large field for illusory cognition. And while illusion has
thus so great a depth in the individual mind, it has a no less striking
breadth or extent in the collective human mind. No doubt its grosser
forms manifest themselves most conspicuously in the undisciplined mind
of the savage and the rustic; yet even the cultivated mind is by no
means free from its control. In truth, most of the illusions illustrated
in this work are such as can be shared in by all classes of mind.
In view of this wide far-reaching area of ascertained error, the mind
naturally asks, What are the real limits of illusory cognition, and how
can we be ever sure of having got beyond them? This question leads us on
to philosophical problems of the greatest consequence, problems which
can only be very lightly touched in this place. Before approaching
these, let us look back a little more carefully and gather up our
results, reflect on the method which we have been unconsciously
adopting, and inquire how far this scientific mode of procedure will
take us in determining what is the whole range of illusory cognition.
We have found an ingredient of illusion mixed up with all the popularly
recognized forms of immediate knowledge. Yet this ingredient is not
equally conspicuous in all cases. First of all, illusion varies very
considerably in its degree of force and persistence. Thus, in general, a
presentative illusion is more coercive than a representative; an
apparent reality present to the mind is naturally felt to be more
indubitable than one absent and only represented. On the other hand, a
representative illusion is often more enduring than a presentative, that
is to say, less easily found out. It is to be added that a good deal of
illusion is only partial, there being throughout an under-current of
rational consciousness, a gentle play of self-criticism, which keeps the
error from developing into a perfect self-delusion. This remark applies
not only to the innocent illusions of art, but also to many of our
every-day illusions, both presentative and representative. In many
cases, indeed, as, for example, in looking at a reflection in a mirror,
the illusion is very imperfect, remaining in the nascent stage.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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