[134] It follows that any great transformation of our environment may lead to a partial confusion with respect to self. For not only do great and violent changes in our surroundings beget profound changes in our feelings and ideas, but since the idea of self is under one of its aspects essentially that of a relation to not-self, any great revolution in the one term, will confuse the recognition of the other. This fact is expressed in the common expression that we "lose ourselves" when in unfamiliar surroundings, and the process of orientation, or "taking our bearings," fails. [135] On these disturbances of memory and self-recognition in insanity, see Griesinger, _op. cit._, pp. 49-51; also Ribot, "Des Desordres Generaux de la Memoire," in the _Revue Philosophique_, August, 1880. It is related by Leuret (_Fragments Psych. sur la Folie_, p. 277) that a patient spoke of his former self as "la personne de moi-meme." [136] In the following account of the process of belief and its errors, I am going over some of the ground traversed by my essay on _Belief, its Varieties and Conditions_ ("Sensation and Intuition," ch. iv.). To this essay I must refer the reader for a fuller analysis of the subject. [137] For an account of the difference of mechanism in memory and expectation, see Taine, _De l'Intelligence_, 2ieme partie, livre premier, ch. ii. sec. 6. [138] J.S. Mill distinguishes expectation as a radically distinct mode of belief from memory, but does not bring out the contrast with respect to activity here emphasized (James Mill's _Analysis of the Human Mind_, edited by J.S. Mill, p. 411, etc.). For a fuller statement of my view of the relation of belief to action, as compared with that of Professor Bain, see my earlier work. [139] For some good remarks on the logical aspects of future events as matters of fact, see Mr. Venn's _Logic of Chance_, ch. x. [140] James Mill's _Analysis of the Human Mind_, edited by J.S. Mill, vol. i p. 414, _et seq._ [141] _Principles of Geology_, ch. iii. [142] To make this rough analysis more complete, I ought, perhaps, to include the effect of all the errors of introspection, memory, and spontaneous belief, into which the person himself falls, in so far as they communicate themselves to others. [143] In the case of a vain woman thinking herself much more pretty than others think her, the error is still more obviously one connected with a belief in objective fact. [144] _The Study of Sociology_, ch. ix. [145] As a matter of fact, the proportion of accurate knowledge to error is far larger in the case of classes than of individuals. Propositions with general terms for subject are less liable to be faulty than propositions with singular terms for subject.