But as we look at the world around us, we realize that the doctrine of _laissez-faire_ has proved inadequate to meet the conditions of modern industrial life, and has broken down under the strain.[349] We realize that self-interest, even enlightened self-interest, is not the safest guide for the individual or for the race. We recognize the fact that the safety of society demands that men shall not be allowed to do as they please, nor to go where they please. The law places many restrictions upon the free movements of men. I may not trespass upon my neighbor’s property; I may not enter public buildings except at specified times. If I wish to visit a fever-stricken and quarantined city, I either am not allowed to go, or I am prevented from coming away when I wish. These are familiar and trivial illustrations, but they emphasize the fact that complete _laissez-faire_ is impossible under present conditions—in fact, probably always has been. A host of other instances of social legislation, pure-food laws, trust regulation, etc., might be invoked to establish the point, were it necessary. The whole series of immigration statutes, increasing in severity from 1882 down to the present, are evidence of the acceptance of this principle with special relation to immigration. The question is not, shall we have regulation or not, but how much and what kind of regulation shall we have? The doctrine of _laissez-faire_, _per se_, would have no greater weight as an argument against complete suspension of immigration than it would have against the exclusion of contract laborers. If the personal inclinations of the individual lead him to prefer to regard the immigration problem in the strictly academic light, no fault can be found; but the denial of the propriety of suggesting plans of control, the demand that the immigrants be let alone, represents an obsolete point of view. Any amount of regulation, which proves necessary to safeguard the interests of society, can be justified in the light of modern opinion and practice.