If the British connection seems of such significance to South African statesmen, in working out the future of their vast country, quite as much does the Empire require the constant advice of those statesmen in directing the difficult diplomacy and making the critical decisions which the control of so much of the continent necessitates. The lack of such advice, directly and consistently sought, is probably at the root of much of the difficulty of the past. In the long run South African opinion must dominate national policy in South Africa. That it should be expressed in an authoritative form, and under a due sense of national responsibility, are the conditions which will make it most helpful, and most reliable. Sir Gordon Sprigg and other public men from the Cape have pointed out to me how peculiar are the {238} problems which arise in South African politics, how much they stand apart from Anglo-Saxon experience in other parts of the world, how impossible it is for anyone who has not to deal with these problems on the spot to understand them. Here, if anywhere, the maxim is true to which I have alluded in another place, that 'only those who know a country are fitted to rule it.' It is only by utilizing the knowledge and experience of the best minds of the country that adequate direction can be given to its external relations as to its internal government. The actual and contingent stake which Great Britain, Australia and other parts of the Empire have in the exclusive use of the Cape as a naval station in time of war may be roughly outlined in figures. Lord Brassey, dwelling upon the importance to the nation of completing the fortification and equipment of the neighbouring harbours, mentions in the Naval Annual for 1890, that at present about £90,000,000 worth of commerce centres at or passes this point every year, including £20,000,000 of outward trade to Australia, £13,000,000 to the Cape itself, and portions of the Indian, Chinese and other Eastern trade which make up the whole. This is under normal conditions. But should the Suez Canal be closed, and it is difficult to see how in a great European war this could be prevented, unless England could obtain and maintain absolute naval control of the Mediterranean, and military control of Egypt, then at least £150,000,000, and possibly £200,000,000 of {239} British trade would be forced to go round the Cape. I have mentioned elsewhere Lord Dufferin's statement, to the London Chamber of Commerce, that if anything ever occurred to take away our control of the Indian markets there is not a cottage in the manufacturing districts of England which would not feel the blow at once. If this be true of the Indian trade alone, the argument becomes much more impressive when applied to the risks which would be incurred, alike by Britain, India, and Australia if they were compelled to depend for the security of the whole vast volume of Eastern and