Imperial Federation: The Problem of National UnityParkin, George R. (George Robert)
History
Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity
Parkin, George R. (George Robert)
Great Britain -- Politics and government; Imperial federation
One of the advantages which Canada has reaped {275} from
internal confederation has been the greatly decreased rate of
interest which she pays for her borrowings. A high financial
authority has estimated that the Australasian colonies would
gain, from a consolidated federal stock, an advantage equal to a
diminution of more that £20,000,000 on the general indebtedness.
Facts such as these have naturally led the advocates of national
unity to suggest a further step and to urge that a financial
federation of the public debts of the Empire, guaranteed by the
strength and resources of the nation at large, would reduce the
cost of public money for the colonies and dependencies to at
least the level of interest paid on the National Debt. It has
been pointed out with force and reason that the saving which
might thus be effected under a guarantee of Imperial unity would
of itself be sufficient to enable the colonies to contribute a
large sum to the national defence without any addition to the
burdens which they now bear, while sensibly relieving the
taxpayer of the United Kingdom. The fixing of a reasonable limit
to thus borrowing on national credit for each portion of the
Empire would, of course, present a difficulty, but it is one
which has, on a small scale, been grappled with in the provinces
of the Canadian confederation, and does not seem to be
altogether insuperable. The federally guaranteed debt would
certainly be held almost exclusively within the Empire itself,
and the general desire for its complete security might fairly be
expected to act as a strong national bond. {276} Enormous as is
the amount which the mother-country has already staked in the
colonies and dependencies, it seems certain that under
favourable conditions capital will more and more seek these
areas of peaceful industrial development rather than take the
risks of internal revolutions in South America or military
convulsions in Europe. With closer union this tendency, in
itself essentially healthy, would increase. With separation, it
would be deeply affected by two considerations: first, the
weakened guarantee of safety to the individual colony: and
second, the new burden which would be laid upon the separating
colony in undertaking single-handed the whole task of defence,
and the whole diplomatic, consular and other organization
incident to national independence. Inevitably expenses would go
up while credit went down. I am satisfied that people either in
England or abroad who for colonial relations thoughtlessly
borrow the simile of the ripe fruit dropping easily from the
parent tree, have formed little conception of the violent
financial wrench involved in the separation of even one great
colony, or of the strength of the financial bond which, every
day increasing in strength, is binding more closely together
with ties of common interest the mother-land and her greatest
offshoots.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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