So far German diplomacy had triumphed. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say German bluff. The conference asked for the sultan and instigated by Germany met in January, 1906, at Algeciras, a little Spanish coast town across the bay from Gibraltar, where the representatives of the powers spent the remainder of the winter in the delicate task of reconciling French claims for predominance in Morocco with the German demands for equality for all. The British delegates gave firm support to their French colleagues, while Germany was stanchly backed by Austria. The deciding voice was really that of the United States, which on this occasion took a part in European affairs for the first time. (It is an interesting fact that the chief American delegate, Mr. Henry White, was again one of the representatives of his country at Versailles, just thirteen years later.) President Roosevelt once told me that, in his opinion, it was largely the moderating influence exercised by the United States at Algeciras which prevented war between Germany and France over the question of Morocco. With great difficulty a scheme of reforms was finally elaborated, but not until France had agreed to a rectification of the German frontiers in the Cameroons and Togoland at her expense in return for a free hand in Morocco. It was eventually agreed that a Moorish gendarmerie under a Swiss inspector-general should be instituted, that a state bank should be established for the protection of foreign loans, that the acquisition of land around the ports by foreigners should be permitted, that the authority of the state over the public works and public services should be recognized, and that the customs administration should be more efficiently controlled. The pact containing these provisions, whereby the Moroccans ceased to be masters in their own house, was signed by the representatives of the powers in April, 1906, and reluctantly accepted by the sultan in June.