Had the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had no other plan but that of doing away with dualism, he would on that account alone have merited love and admiration. In Aehrenthal's and Berchtold's time Hungarian policy settled the Serbian disputes; it made an alliance with Roumania an impossibility; it accomplished the food blockade in Austria during the war; prevented all internal reforms; and, finally, at the last moment, through Karolyi's petty shortsighted selfishness, the front was beaten. This severe judgment on Hungary's influence on the war remains true, in spite of the undoubtedly splendid deeds of the Magyar troops. The Hungarian is of a strong, courageous, and manly disposition; therefore, almost always an excellent soldier; but, unfortunately, in the course of the last fifty years, Hungarian policy has done more injury than the Hungarian soldier possibly could make good in the war. Once, during the war, a Hungarian met my reproaches with the rejoinder that we could be quite sure about the Hungarians, they were so firmly linked to Austria. "Yes," said I; "Hungary is firmly linked to us, but like a stone a drowning man has tied round his own neck." If we had not lost the war a fight to the death with the Magyars would have been inevitable, because it is impossible to conceive that any sensible European _consortium_ would consent to be brought into partnership with Magyar aspirations and plans for dominion. But, of course, during the war an open fight with Budapest was impossible. Whether the nations that once composed the Habsburg Empire will ever be reunited is an open question; should it come to pass, may a kind fate preserve us from a return of dualism. 2 On December 26, 1916--four days after entering upon office--I received a letter from Tisza in which he imparted to me his views on the tactics to be observed: All the European neutrals feel that they are more seriously threatened by England than by us. The events in Greece, Roumania, etc., as well as England's commercial tyranny, act in our favour, and the difference of our attitude to the peace plans as compared with that of the Entente--if consistently and cleverly carried out--will secure neutral sympathy for our group of Powers. From this point of view I see that the chief danger will be that our necessarily cautious attitude as regards revealing our war aims may give rise to the idea that we are merely trifling with a plan for peace for tactical reasons and do not really earnestly desire peace. We must therefore furnish our representatives accredited to neutrals (the most important being Spain and Holland) with the necessary instructions, so that they may be able to account for our cautious attitude and explain the reasons that keep us from making a premature or one-sided announcement of our conditions.