"If I may now be allowed to go further into these proposals, I must, to begin with, point out two things: "So far as the proposals are concerned with _our Allies_--mention is made of the German possession of _Belgium_ and of the _Turkish Empire_--I declare that, in fulfilment of our duty to our Allies, I am firmly determined _to hold out in defence of our Allies to the very last. The pre-war possessions of our Allies we will defend equally with our own_. This standpoint is that of all four Allies in complete reciprocity with ourselves. "In the second place, I have to point out that I must _politely but definitely decline_ to consider the Point dealing with our internal Government. We have in Austria _a parliament elected by general, equal, direct and secret ballot_. There is not a more democratic parliament in the world, and this parliament, together with the other constitutionally admissible factors, has the sole right to decide upon matters of _Austrian internal affairs_. I speak of _Austria_ only, because I do not refer to _Hungarian_ internal affairs in the _Austrian Delegation_. I should not consider it constitutional to do so. _And we do not interfere in American affairs; but, on the other hand, we do not wish for any foreign guidance from any state whatever._ Having said this, I may be permitted, with regard to the remaining Points, to state as follows: "As to the Point dealing with the abolition of 'secret diplomacy' and the introduction of full openness in the negotiations, I have nothing to say. From my point of view I have _no objection to such public negotiations so long as full reciprocity_ is the basis of the same, though I do entertain _considerable doubt_ as to whether, all things considered, _it is the quickest and most practical method_ of arriving at a result. Diplomatic negotiations are simply a matter of business. But it might easily be imagined that in the case, for instance, of commercial treaties between one country and another it would not be advisable _to publish incomplete results beforehand_ to the world. In such negotiations both parties naturally commence by setting their demands as high as possible in order to climb down gradually, using this or that expressed demand as matter for _compensation in_ other ways until finally an _equilibrium of the opposing interests is arrived at_, a point which must necessarily be reached if agreement is to be come to at all. If such negotiations were to be carried on with full publicity, nothing could prevent the general public from passionately defending every separate clause involved, regarding any concession as a defeat, even when such clauses had only been advanced _for tactical reasons_. And when the public takes up any such point with particular fervour, ultimate agreement may be thereby rendered impossible or the final agreement may, if arrived at, be regarded as in itself _a defeat_, possibly by both sides. And this would not