And now, gentlemen, I should like to say a few words on the subject of that unfortunate submarine campaign which was undoubtedly the beginning of the end, and to set forth the reasons which in this case, as in many other instances, forced us to adopt tactics not in accordance with our own convictions. Shortly after my appointment as Minister the idea of unrestricted submarine warfare began to take form in German minds. The principal advocate of this plan was Admiral Tirpitz. To the credit of the former _Reichskansler_, Bethmann-Hollweg, be it said that he was long opposed to the idea, and used all means and every argument to dissuade others from adopting so perilous a proceeding. In the end he was forced to give way, as was the case with all politicians who came in conflict with the all-powerful military party. Admiral Holtzendorff came to us at that time, and the question was debated from every point of view in long conferences lasting for hours. My then ministerial colleagues, Tisza and Clam, as well as myself were entirely in agreement with Emperor Charles in rejecting the proposal, and the only one who then voted unreservedly in favour of it was Admiral Haus. It should here be noted that the principal German argument at that time was not the prospect of starving England into submission, but the suggestion that the Western front could not be held unless the American munition transports were sunk--that is to say, the case for the submarine campaign was then based chiefly on a point of _technical military importance_ and nothing else. I myself earnestly considered the question then of separating ourselves from Germany on this point; with the small number of U-boats at our disposal it would have made but little difference had we on our part refrained. But another point had here to be considered. If the submarine campaign was to succeed in the northern waters it must be carried out at the same time in the Mediterranean. With this latter water unaffected the transports would have been sent via Italy, France and Dover to England, and the northern U-boat campaign would have been paralysed. But in order to carry on submarine war in the Adriatic we should have to give the Germans access to our bases, such as Pola, Cattaro and Trieste, and by so doing we were _de facto_ partaking in the submarine campaign ourselves. If we did not do it, then we were attacking Germany in the rear by hindering their submarine campaign--that is to say, it would bring us into direct conflict with Germany. Therefore, albeit sorely against our will, we agreed, not convinced by argument, but unable to act otherwise.