[69] In 1899, the Government of India contemplated the possibility of a loan. See their despatch of August 24, 1899 (H. of C. 495 of 1913, p. 13):—“If India were afflicted with famine or other adverse circumstances in the earlier years of our new currency, and before an adequate reserve had accumulated, circumstances might arise in which borrowing to maintain the standard would become an absolute necessity. We should have preferred to have been armed against such a contingency ... not by actual borrowing but by obtaining power to borrow.... We have learnt with satisfaction ... that your lordship has stated in the House of Commons that borrowing would be resorted to if it should prove to be necessary.” [70] See Chap. VII. [71] See p. 215. [72] The Government was on the point of sanctioning this advance when the urgent necessity for it came to an end, and the advance was not actually made. [73] I will recur to this proposal in Chapter VII. [74] For the movements of the Indian bank–rate in the autumn and spring of 1907–8, see the chart appended to Chap. VIII. Eventually, on January 16, 1908, the Bengal rate did rise to 9 per cent (the Bombay rate did not rise to this level until February 7); but this is not very abnormal in the winter, and the average rate for money in 1907–8 was lower than in the corresponding season of the two busy years 1905–6 and 1906–7. [75] For a fuller discussion of this question in relation to the events of 1907–8, see my article on “Recent Economic Events in India” in the _Economic Journal_, March 1909. [76] Aggregate exports of Indian produce and manufactures: 1906–7, £115,625,135; 1911–12, £147,813,000. [77] The Government of India stands in a particularly strong position in this respect, because few countries have so good a market for their loans at a foreign centre as India has. [78] In continuation of what has been said in § 4. [79] See Brunyate, _loc. cit._ chap. vii., from which the greater part of what follows is summarised. [80] All this refers to the balances at the Head Offices. “There is no limit to the Government deposits at branch offices. But the latter are held absolutely at call, and in actual practice are removed with the utmost freedom.”—Brunyate, _loc. cit._ p. 98. [81] See table given on p. 204. [82] The exceptional circumstances of 1913 are dealt with in Chap. VIII. [83] See Report of Comptroller of Currency, 1911–12: “In July the balance generally reaches its highest level. From July onwards until December the revenue collections are comparatively small and the balances steadily go down till they reach their minimum level in November or December. After December the surplus revenue receipts far exceed the demands for expenditure.” [84] See also Lord Inchcape’s letter to the _Times_ of November 12, 1912. I forbear to enter in detail into what is not, in reality, one of the truly vital aspects of Indian Government Finance.