Thus matters went on until the end of December 1907, when the authorities nerved themselves, although the immediate necessity had temporarily disappeared through a slight strengthening of exchange, to take whatever drastic steps might be necessary to maintain the gold value of the rupee. It was announced that they would sell in India telegraphic transfers on London at a fixed rate. Before the need arose for acting on this announcement, it was changed into an offer to sell sterling bills on London at the fixed minimum rate of ⅓–29/32. By March 1908 the reserves of actual gold were nearly exhausted, but the securities and cash at short notice had not yet been trenched on. Early in April exchange was again weak, and the offer referred to above came into active operation. At first £500,000 a week, and later £1,000,000 a week of sterling bills on London were sold in India at ⅓–29/32. These were cashed in London from the proceeds of selling securities from the Gold Standard Reserve. By August 1908 about £8,000,000 of bills had been cashed in this way. At the beginning of September 1908 the sterling reserves, which I give for comparison with the amounts in September 1907 quoted above, were, approximately, as follows:— _Gold_— Currency Reserve in India £150,000 Currency Reserve in London 1,850,000 ——————————– £2,000,000 ═══════════ _Money at Short Notice_— Gold Standard Reserve in London _nil._ Cash Balances in London £1,850,000 ——————————– £1,850,000 ═══════════ _Sterling Securities_— In Currency Reserve £1,300,000 In Gold Standard Reserve 6,000,000 ——————————– £7,300,000 ═══════════ _Aggregate Sterling Resources_— Gold £2,000,000 Money at Short Notice 1,850,000 Securities 7,300,000 ——————————– £11,150,000 ═══════════