It is not assumed by the gentlemen who prepared the above estimates that claims of such magnitude could be seriously considered by an independent Republic. The resources of the Island at present are entirely inadequate to shoulder such a debt. Upon the reduced basis of the salaries paid the United States soldiers, the reduction would be about one half, or less than $30,000,000, an equally impossible sum. On the other hand, that some aid should be rendered by the United States to enable these soldiers to disband and go to work would seem both feasible and just. It could easily be met by the revenue of the Island, and would have a decided effect in securing permanent peace and the early establishment of a stable government in Cuba. If done now under the guidance of the United States it would prevent excessive payment to the troops hereafter. In the same manner the liquidation of the small amount of outstanding obligation--not exceeding $2,500,000--might settle the debt question for all time to come. Especially if all other advances for these purposes were prohibited until such debt was adjusted to the satisfaction of the United States. In case the ultimate solution of the Cuban question should be, as it is quite within the range of probability, annexation, the independent government will not previously have had the opportunity of incurring improvident indebtedness, which ultimately may have to be assumed by the United States. In short, whatever may be done in this matter, or however it may be done, the United States should control and safeguard the finances of the Island for a considerable period. It has been very truly stated that should an independent government be established and recognised, the United States will no longer be able to control the financial legislation of the Island. It can, however, by the plan proposed, and very properly, not only save money for Cuba while under its military possession or control, but also prevent the making of unnecessary improvident or other loans by such independent government, except with the consent, or approval in advance, of the United States. This can be readily done, if, when making an advance for the benefit of Cuba, the right to apply the customs receipts and other revenues of the Island to the repayment of the principal and interest of such advance be reserved to the United States. In this way all reckless expenditure may be prevented and all speculative or independent bond issues be avoided and at the same time quick assistance be rendered those whose position at present is deplorable in the extreme. CHAPTER XV REVENUE--CUSTOMS TARIFF The revenues and expenditures of the Island of Cuba for the fiscal year 1898-99, according to the reports obtained by the author from the Secretary of the Treasury, Marquis Rafael Montoro, may be thus summarised: BALANCE OF THE ESTIMATED RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE BUDGET OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA FOR 1898-99