INFANTRY IN ATTACK AND DEFENCE. =124.= GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 1. It is impossible to lay down a fixed and unvarying system of attack or defence. Although such system might appear capable of modification to meet different conditions, yet constant practice in a stereotyped formation inevitably leads to want of elasticity, accustoms all ranks to work by rule rather than by the exercise of their wits, and cramps both initiative and intelligence. In peace exercises, where blank cartridges take the place of bullets, the inherent and paralysing defects of a normal system may easily escape notice; in war they betray themselves in waste of life and failure. It is therefore strictly forbidden either to formulate or to practise a normal form of either attack or defence. To the training of the troops in movements before the enemy, general principles and broad rules alone are applicable; and the practical knowledge of these principles and rules can only be instilled by intelligent instruction and constantly diversified exercises on broken ground. 2. In no two military operations is the situation exactly the same. The character of the ground, the extent of the co-operation of the other arms, the strength and _moral_ of the opposing forces, their physical condition, and the objects they wish to achieve must always differ. 3. The attitude originally assumed by either, or both, of the opposing forces, may be reversed during an engagement. A vigorous counter-attack by an army offering battle in a defensive position may throw the adversary on the defensive; or an assailant may fight a delaying or retaining action in one part of the field, while in another part his action may be essentially offensive; but these and other variations in a combat resolve themselves in every case into attack and defence. 4. Since the conditions of modern warfare render decentralisation of command in action an absolute necessity, no good results are to be expected unless the subordinate leaders have been trained to use their intelligence, and unless they have been given ample opportunities of acting on their own judgment in attack and defence, and have constantly, in peace practices, been called upon to consider the necessity of departing from their original orders. Nor can the results be good if commanding officers fail to realise the very limited extent to which they are able to exert their powers of command under fire, and if, in peace, they attempt to exercise a personal control which would be impossible in action. They should be most careful, therefore, to act in peace practices exactly as they would in war, and abstain from all interference which would be impracticable under fire. 5. During the combat, as at all other times, the commander of every body of troops is responsible for the local protection of his command against surprise.