Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965MacGregor, Morris J.
History
Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965
MacGregor, Morris J.
African American soldiers; United States -- Race relations
Forrestal accepted Jacob's argument that as long as the war (p. 085)
continued any move toward integrating the fighting ships was
impractical. At the same time, he agreed with the Special Programs
Unit that large concentrations of Negroes in shore duties lowered
efficiency and morale. Forrestal compromised by ordering the bureau to
prepare as an experiment a plan for the integration of some fleet
auxiliary ships. On 20 May 1944 he outlined the problem for the
President:
"From a morale standpoint, the Negroes resent the fact that they are
not assigned to general service billets at sea, and white personnel
resent the fact that Negroes have been given less hazardous
assignments." He explained that at first Negroes would be used only on
the large auxiliaries, and their number would be limited to not more
than 10 percent of the ship's complement. If this step proved
workable, he planned to use Negroes in small numbers on other types of
ships "as necessity indicates." The White House answered: "OK,
FDR."[3-86]
[Footnote 3-86: Memo, SecNav for President, 20 May
44, Forrestal file, GenRecsNav.]
Secretary Forrestal also won the support of the Chief of Naval
Operations for the move, but Admiral King still considered integration
in the fleet experimental and was determined to keep strict control
until the results were known. On 9 August 1944 King informed the
commanding officers of twenty-five large fleet auxiliaries that
Negroes would be assigned to them in the near future. As Forrestal had
suggested, King set the maximum number of Negroes at 10 percent of the
ship's general service. Of this number, 15 percent would be
third-class petty officers from shore activities, selected as far as
possible from volunteers and, in any case, from those who had served
the longest periods of shore duty. Of the remainder, 43 percent would
be from Class A schools and 42 percent from recruit training. The
basic 10 percent figure proved to be a theoretical maximum; no ship
received that many Negroes.
Admiral King insisted that equal treatment in matters of training,
promotion, and duty assignments must be accorded all hands, but he
left the matter of berthing to the commanding officers, noting that
experience had proved that in the shore establishment, when the
percentage of blacks to whites was small, the two groups could be
successfully mingled in the same compartments. He also pointed out
that a thorough indoctrination of white sailors before the arrival of
the Negroes had been useful in preventing racial friction ashore.[3-87]
[Footnote 3-87: Ltr, CNO to CO, USS _Antaeus_ et al.,
9 Aug 44, sub: Negro Enlisted Personnel--Assignment
of to Ships of the Fleet, P16-3/MM, OpNavArchives.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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